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Over a decade has passed since India’s patent laws were significantly 
amended to fulfill the country’s obligations under the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).5 The 2005 amendments 
to the Patents Act6 were the third in a series of installments to meet India’s TRIPS 
obligations. Earlier, the amendments in 1999 had ushered in a transitional “mail-
box” provision and exclusive marketing rights for pharmaceutical products.7 The 
2002 amendments, among others, somewhat controversially expanded the list of 
statutorily excluded subject matter.8 The 2005 amendments dispensed with the 
transitional—and exclusive—marketing-rights provisions of the 1999 amendments 
along with certain modifications to the excluded subject matter list from the 2002 
amendments.9 
For the most part, the transition of India’s patent system post TRIPS has 
been rather straightforward. However, certain aspects of the Patents Act, 1970, as 
amended in 2005, have attracted considerable attention, particularly the list of 
exclusions from patentability under Section 3 of the Patents Act.10 Other issues of 
significance to users of the Indian patent system are the seemingly onerous 
requirements to disclose details pertaining to related foreign applications; the 
compulsory licensing regime; and the requirement to annually file working 
statements after the grant of a patent.  
Almost all of the arguably contentious aspects of the Indian Patent Law 
trace their origin to Justice Ayyangar’s Report on the Revision of the Patents Law 
(the Ayyangar Report) submitted to the Indian Parliament in September 1959.11 
Accordingly, this review begins with a historical perspective, drawing from the 
Ayyangar Report, of why those provisions came to be incorporated into the Indian 
Patent Law. The provisions are categorized into three broad categories: 
compulsory licenses and working of patents; exclusions from patentability; and 
disclosures related to foreign applications. For each category, we analyze the 
recommendations of the Ayyangar Report that led to the enactment of the Patents 
Act, 1970, as well as the changes brought by the trilogy of amendments at the turn 
of the millennium leading to the Indian Patent Law as it is in force today. Finally, 
the evolution of jurisprudence over the past decade is synthesized to shed light on 
the current state of law with respect to those controversial provisions.   
 
                                                 
5 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/trips_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPs]. 
6 Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India) [hereinafter 2005 
Amendments]. 
7 Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999, No. 17, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India) [hereinafter 1999 
Amendments]. 
8 Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, No. 38, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India) [hereinafter 2002 
Amendments]. 
9 2005 Amendments, supra note 2, at § 3. 
10 Id. 
11 Patents Enquiry Committee, N Rajagopala Ayyangar, Report on the Revision of the Patents Law, 
1959 [hereinafter Ayyangar Report]. 
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE PATENTS ACT, 1970 
 
Shortly after India’s independence in 1947, a Patents Enquiry 
Committee12 was created in 1948 to review the Patent Laws in India to “ensure 
that the patent system was more conducive to national interests.”13 Based on the 
Committee’s interim report, the compulsory licensing and working provisions of 
the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 191114 were amended to bring them in line 
with similar provisions in the UK Patents Act of 1949. Specifically, sections 22 
and 23 of the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911 were amended to expand the 
grounds for the grant of compulsory licenses, including non-working of patents in 
India and failure to meet the requirements of the public on reasonable terms.15 
Further amendments were introduced in 1952 to extend the compulsory licensing 
regime to “food and medicines, insecticide, germicide or fungicide and a process 
for producing substance or any invention relating to surgical or curative 
devices.”16 However, the 1952 amendments were repealed in whole in 1957.17 
The Patents Bill, 195318 was tabled in Parliament as a separate enactment 
for dealing with patents in accordance with the final report of the Committee. The 
Patents Bill, 1953 generally followed the U.K. Patents Statute of 1949 with some 
changes based on the Committee’s recommendations. Section 3 of the Patents Bill, 
1953, for the first time, included an enumerated list of inventions that were not 
considered patentable. The compulsory licensing provisions were substantially 
retained; however, revocation of patents for non-working inventions was 
omitted.19 The bill also proposed to confer powers on the controller to call for 
information on the working of patents in India from the patentee or the exclusive 
licensee.20 However, the Bill lapsed when the first Lok Sabha (the lower house of 
the Indian Parliament) was dissolved.  
                                                 
12 The Patents Enquiry Committee was appointed on October 1, 1948 and included seven members, 
including Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand and Mr. K Rama Pai, former Controller of Patents as Member-
Secretary. 
13 Ayyangar, supra note 7, at para. 1. 
14 Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1911(India), at §§ 22–23. 
15 Amendments to sections 22, 23, and 23A to 23G of the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911 (Act 
32 of 1950) were based on the interim report of the Committee submitted in August, 1949. The final 
report of the Committee was submitted in April 1950. 
16 CONTROLLER GENERAL OF PATENTS DESIGNS AND TRADEMARKS, HISTORY OF INDIAN PATENT 
SYSTEM, at ¶ 7, http://www.ipindia.nic.in/history-of-indian-patent-system.htm (last visited March 13, 
2016).  
17 Indian Patents and Designs [Amendments] Act, 1952, No. 70, Acts of Parliament, 1952 (India) 
(repealed in whole by The Repealing and Amending Act, 1957, No. 36, Acts of Parliament, 1957 
(India)). 
18 The Patents Bill, 1953 (was not proceeded with and lapsed by Lok Sabha, 1953) [hereinafter Patents 
Bill, 1953]. 
19 Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1911 (India), at §§ 22–23 
(providing grounds for revocation). However, the Ayyangar Report notes that these were omitted in the 
1950 amendments as well as the Patents Bill, 1953; see Ayyangar, supra note 6, at ¶ 611. 
20 Patents Bill, 1953, supra note 14, at cl. 105. 
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In 1957, the Indian Government entrusted Justice N Rajagopala 
Ayyangar, an eminent Indian jurist, with the task of advising on revisions to the 
patent and design laws. Justice Ayyangar was highly critical of the then current 
Indian patent system. He felt that it “ha[d] failed in its main purpose, namely to 
stimulate invention among Indians and to encourage the development and 
exploitation of new inventions for industrial purposes in the country so as to 
secure the benefits thereof to the largest section of the public.”21 Justice 
Ayyangar’s final report consequently contained a comprehensive set of 
recommendations for revisions to the patent laws,22 which laid the foundations for 
the first major reforms in the patent laws of independent India in 1970.23  
The Patents Act, 1970,24 adopted almost all the recommendations of 
Justice Ayyangar. Of specific interest is Justice Ayyangar’s views on the scope of 
statutory provisions for compulsory licensing and working of patents; exclusions 
from patentability; and disclosure of details pertaining to related foreign 
applications, each of which is discussed in this article. In addition, the Patents Act, 
1970 introduced restrictions on product patents and allowed only methods or 
processes of manufacture to be patentable for food, medicines, and chemicals 
based on the recommendations of Justice Ayyangar.25 These restrictions were 
included as Section 5 of the Patents Act 1970.26 Inventions relating to atomic 
energy were also excluded from patent protection.27  
                                                 
21 See N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE PATENTS LAW 1959 (Government of 
India 1959), quoted in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ASIA 59 (Paul Goldstein & Joseph Strauss eds., 
2009). 
22 Ayyangar, supra note 7. 
23 An earlier attempt in 1965 via The Patents Bill, 1965 based on the Ayyangar Report died with the 
dissolution of the third Lok Sabha in 1967. 
24 The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India) [hereinafter Patents Act, 1970]. 
25 Ayyangar, supra note 7, at ¶ 327. 
26 Patents Act, supra note 20, at § 5.  
27 Id. at § 4. 
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III. COMPULSORY LICENSES AND WORKING OF PATENTS 
 
“A compulsory license is an involuntary contract between a willing buyer 
and an unwilling seller imposed and enforced by the state.”28 The compulsory 
licensing of patents is one of the most contentious issue in patent law 
internationally. Various countries support the practice as necessary to ensure 
access to socially beneficial technologies. Other countries disfavor compulsory 
licensing because of the harm it inflicts on the incentive to invent and the creation 
of the very technology at issue. Compulsory licensing has long been recognized 
internationally in accordance with the Paris Convention of 188329 and has been a 
fixture in patent systems around the world, especially those of developing 
countries. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of compulsory licensing has remained a 
persistent topic of controversy. 
Justice Ayyangar in his Report, termed non-working of patents an “evil” 
and sought to provide remedies “from foreign owned patents which are not 
worked in the country, but which are held either to block the industries of the 
country or to secure a monopoly of importation.”30 The Ayyangar Report provides 
a detailed account of the use of compulsory licensing and revocation for non-
working in various countries, with specific emphasis on the United Kingdom. The 
Ayyangar Report states, “[i]f a country with the industrial progress of the U.K. is 
unwilling to drop the provision as to revocation for non-working in her law, the 
need for such provision in the circumstances of our country requires no elaborate 
argument.”31 Justice Ayyangar went on not only to recommend retaining the 
compulsory licensing and revocation for non-working provisions from the Patents 
Bill 1953, but also to expand the grounds for awarding compulsory licenses and 
revocations.32 The recommendations of the Ayyangar Report were substantially 
adopted as Chapter XVI in the Patents Act, 1970.33 The compulsory licensing 
provisions continue to exist even after the trilogy of amendments to bring India’s 
Patent Laws to be in compliance with TRIPS.34  
                                                 
28 Gorecki, P.K., REGULATING THE PRICE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN CANADA: COMPULSORY 
LICENSING, PRODUCT SELECTION, AND GOVERNMENT REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAMS, (Economic 
Council of Canada 1981).  
29 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 5A, ¶ 4, Mar. 20, 1883; “A 
compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to work or insufficient working 
before the expiration of a period of four years from the date of filing of the patent application or three 
years from the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period expires last; it shall be refused if the 
patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons. Such a compulsory license shall be non-exclusive 
and shall not be transferable, even in the form of the grant of a sub-license, except with that part of the 
enterprise or goodwill which exploits such license.”  
30 Ayyangar, supra note 7 at ¶ 45(3). 
31 Id. at § 1.V, cl. 142. 
32 Id. at § 1.V, cl. 143.  
33 Patents Act 1970, supra note 20, at ch. XVI §§ 82–98. 
34 Patents Act, supra note 5, at ch. XVI, §§ 84-94.  
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Indeed, TRIPS addresses the concept of compulsory licensing, although 
the phrase “compulsory license” never appears in the patent part of the agreement. 
TRIPS allows the grant of compulsory licenses as an exception to the agreement’s 
minimum requirement that all Member States must afford a patentee the right of 
exclusivity during the complete patent term under specific circumstances.35 In 
addition, the World Trade Organization’s 2003 Implementation Decision of the 
Doha Ministerial on TRIPS and Public Health permits compulsory licenses to be 
obtained to manufacture and export patented medicines to other countries not 
having local manufacturing capacity.36  
 With this background, we now review the developments in the 
compulsory licensing practice in India over the past decade.   
 
A. Statutory Provisions 
 
Section 8437 of the Patents Act provides the broadest grounds for seeking 
a compulsory license. A compulsory license seeker under Section 84 cannot file an 
application until after the targeted patent has been in force for a minimum of three 
years, and must make out a prima facie case in order to be granted the license. The 
patent owner may initiate an opposition proceeding against the grant of this type of 
compulsory license. Additionally, under this procedure, the compulsory license 
may be granted for supply of the patented product only in the domestic market.  
                                                 
35 TRIPS, supra note 1, at arts. 30 and 31. 
36 DOHA, DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH, WTO Ministerial (2001).  
37 Patents Act 1970, supra note 20, at § 84.  
(1) At any time after the expiration of three years from the date of the grant of a patent, any person 
interested may make an application to the Controller for grant of compulsory licence on patent on any 
of the following grounds, namely:— 
(a) that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not 
been satisfied, or 
(b) that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price, or 
(c) that the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India. 
 
(2) An application under this section may be made by any person notwithstanding that he is already the 
holder of a licence under the patent and no person shall be estopped from alleging that the reasonable 
requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention are not satisfied or that the patented 
invention is not worked in the territory of India or that the patented invention is not available to the 
public at a reasonably affordable price by reason of any admission made by him, whether in such a 
licence or otherwise or by reason of his having accepted such a licence. 
 
(3) Every application under sub-section (1) shall contain a statement setting out the nature of the 
applicant's interest together with such particulars as may be prescribed and the facts upon which the 
application is based. 
 
(4) The Controller, if satisfied that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the 
patented invention have not been satisfied or that the patented invention is not worked in the territory of 
India or that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price, may 
grant a licence upon such terms as he may deem fit. 
 
(5) Where the Controller directs the patentee to grant a licence he may, as incidental thereto, exercise 
the powers set out in section 88. 
 
(6) In considering the application field under this section, the Controller shall take into account,— 
(i) the nature of the invention, the time which has elapsed since the sealing of the patent and 
the measures already taken by the patentee or any licensee to make full use of the invention; 
7Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
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 Section 8438 of the Patents Act is a more limited provision for the grant of 
compulsory licenses on notification of the Indian government in circumstances of 
national emergency such as a public health crisis.  
Section 92A39 of the Patents Act, added by the 2005 Amendments, 
permits manufacture and export of patented medicines to other countries not 
having local manufacturing capacity in accordance with the WTO’s Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.40 
                                                                                                                
(ii)  the ability of the applicant to work the invention to the public advantage; 
(iii)  the capacity of the applicant to undertake the risk in providing capital and working the 
invention, if the application were granted; 
(iv)  as to whether the applicant has made efforts to obtain a licence from the patentee on 
reasonable terms and conditions and such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period as 
the Controller may deem fit: 
           
Provided that this clause shall not be applicable in case of national emergency or other circumstances 
of extreme urgency or in case of public non-commercial use or on establishment of a ground of anti-
competitive practices adopted by the patentee, but shall not be required to take into account matters 
subsequent to the making of the application. 
 
Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (iv), "reasonable period" shall be construed as a period not 
ordinarily exceeding a period of six months. 
(7) For the purposes of this Chapter, the reasonable requirements of the public shall be deemed not to 
have been satisfied— 
 (a) if, by reason of the refusal of the patentee to grant a licence or licences on reasonable 
terms,— 
 (i) an existing trade or industry or the development thereof or the establishment 
of any new trade or industry in India or the trade or industry of any person or class of 
persons trading or manufacturing in India is prejudiced; or 
(ii) the demand for the patented article has not been met to an adequate extent or 
on reasonable terms; or 
(iii)  a market for export of the patented article manufactured in India is not 
being supplied or developed; or 
   (iv)  the establishment or development of commercial activities in India is 
prejudiced; or 
 
(b) if, by reason of conditions imposed by the patentee upon the grant of licences under the 
patent or upon the purchase, hire or use of the patented article or process, the manufacture, use or sale 
of materials not protected by the patent, or the establishment or development of any trade or industry in 
India, is prejudiced; or 
(c) if the patentee imposes a condition upon the grant of licences under the patent to provide 
exclusive grant back, prevention to challenges to the validity of patent or coercive package licensing; or 
(d) if the patented invention is not being worked in the territory of India on a commercial 
scale to an adequate extent or is not being so worked to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable; 
or 
(e) if the working of the patented invention in the territory of India on a commercial scale is 
being prevented or hindered by the importation from abroad of the patented article by— 
       (i)  the patentee or persons claiming under him; or 
       (ii)  persons directly or indirectly purchasing from him; or 
      (iii)  other persons against whom the patentee is not taking or has not taken 
proceedings for infringement. 
 
38 Patents Act, supra note 5, at § 92. 
39 Id. at § 92A.  
Compulsory license for export of patented pharmaceutical products in certain exceptional 
circumstances 
(1) Compulsory licence shall be available for manufacture and export of patented 
pharmaceutical product to any country having insufficient or no manufacturing 
8https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol8/iss1/2
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Section 9141 of the Patents Act provides for compulsory licenses to 
remove blocking patents by brokering a cross-license.  
All applications for the grant of compulsory licenses are made to the 
Controller General of Patents (Controller), who is the head of the Indian Patents 
Office, and appeals from the Controller’s decisions are heard first by the 
Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB), an administrative tribunal similar to 
the PTAB, and ultimately by the Indian Supreme Court. 
 
B. Compulsory Licensing: 2007 to 2011 
 
The first ever compulsory license application following the 2005 
amendments was filed under Section 92A by Natco Pharma Ltd. (Natco) in 
September 2007. The application sought a compulsory license for the manufacture 
and thereafter exportation to Nepal of F Hoffman La Roche Ltd.’s (Roche) 
patented anti-cancer drug, Erlonitib (Patent No. 196774), sold under the brand 
name Tarceva, and Pfizer’s anti-cancer drug Sunitinib (Patent No. 209251), sold 
under the brand name Sutent. While the application was still under consideration, 
Natco filed an interlocutory petition before the Controller asserting that Section 
92A did not provide an opportunity for patentees whose patents were the subject 
of compulsory license applications to be heard, and therefore neither Roche nor 
Pfizer should have a right to respond to Natco’s application.42 Natco possibly 
raised this contention owing to the fact that, unlike the scheme of compulsory 
license provided under Section 84 of the Patents Act, which expressly allows the 
patentee an opportunity to be heard,43 the compulsory license scheme provided 
under Section 92A of the Patents Act does not specifically provide for any such 
opportunity. However, Natco subsequently withdrew the compulsory license 
application before any pronouncements could be made on the merits of Natco’s 
position, thus, leaving the issue of a patentee’s opportunity to be heard undecided.  
                                                                                                                
capacity in the pharmaceutical sector for the concerned product to address public 
health problems, provided compulsory licence has been granted by such country or 
such country has, by notification or otherwise, allowed importation of the patented 
pharmaceutical products from India. 
(2) The Controller shall, on receipt of an application in the prescribed manner, grant a 
compulsory licence solely for manufacture and export of the concerned 
pharmaceutical product to such country under such terms and conditions as may be 
specified and published by him. 
(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be without prejudice to the extent to 
which pharmaceutical products produced under a compulsory license can be exported 
under any other provision of this Act. 
Explanation: For the purposes of this section, ‘pharmaceutical products’ means any patented product, 
or product manufactured through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to address 
public health problems and shall be inclusive of ingredients necessary for their manufacture and 
diagnostic kits required for their use. 
40 DOHA, in Fourth Session of Ministerial Conference (November 2001). 
41 Id. at § 91. 
42 Swarup Kumar, “Compulsory Licensing Provision Under TRIPS: a Study of Roche vs. Natco Case in 
India vis-à-vis The Applicability of the Principle of Audi Alteram Partem”, SCRIPTed Vol. 7, No.1 
(March 15, 2010). 
43 Patents Act 1970, supra note 20, at § 87 
Procedure for dealing with applications under §§ 84 and 85.- 
9Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
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The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), situated 
within the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, is responsible for the 
administration of the Patent system in India. In August 2010, it released a 
discussion paper to address concerns regarding market-availability of low-price 
life-saving drug.44 The objective was to facilitate development of a predictable 
environment for the use of compulsory licensing in the pharmaceutical sector, 
thereby balancing the rights of the patent holder and the governmental obligation 
to ensure availability of products, especially life-saving drugs, at reasonable 
prices. In the paper, different stakeholders' views were sought on the scope of 
compulsory licensing provisions to gauge the need for new guidelines. The DIPP 
received a diverse set of responses from academics, domestic industry bodies, 
foreign industry groups, and of course public health NGOs.45 The generic drug 
industry supported the general view of the DIPP in its paper while the innovator 
companies strongly opposed any move to dilute their existing patent rights through 
the issuance of compulsory licenses. 
On April 11, 2011, the DIPP issued a press release stating that the 
existing legal provisions were sufficient and that there was no need for any further 
guidelines for the issuance of compulsory licenses46. Significantly, the DIPP also 
advised the Controller not to delegate the power to any subordinate authority so 
that compulsory license matters could be decided promptly and the power to grant 
licenses was exercised with due care and caution.47  
 
                                                                                                                
(1) Where the Controller is satisfied, upon consideration of an application under section 84, or section 
85, that a prima facie case has been made out for the making of an order, he shall direct the applicant to 
serve copies of the application upon the patentee and any other person appearing from the register to be 
interested in the patent in respect of which the application is made, and 175 [shall publish the 
application in the official journal]. 
(2) The patentee or any other person desiring to oppose the application may, within such time as may 
be prescribed or within such further time as the Controller may on application (made either before or 
after the expiration of the prescribed time) allow, give to the Controller notice of opposition. 
(3) Any such notice of opposition shall contain a statement setting out the grounds on which the 
application is opposed. 
(4) Where any such notice of opposition is duly given, the Controller shall notify the applicant, and 
shall give to the applicant and the opponent an opportunity to be heard before deciding the case. 
 
 
44 Government starts review of Compulsory Licensing Norms, BUSINESS STANDARD, Aug 25, 2010; 
http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/government-starts-review-of-compulsory-
licensing-norms-110082500080_1.html. 
45Press Release, DIPP (April 11, 2011), 
http://dipp.nic.in/English/acts_rules/Press_Release/pr11042011.pdf. 
46 Supra note 38. 
47 Supra note 41. 
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C. Compulsory Licensing: 2011 Onwards 
 
The first post-TRIPS compulsory license was granted in 2012 to Natco 
for Bayer Corporation’s (Bayer) anti-cancer drug sorafenib tosylate (Indian Patent 
No. 215758), sold under the brand name Nexavar. Bayer appealed against the 
grant of the compulsory license all the way to the Supreme Court of India, but in 
vain. All the appellate judicial forums upheld that grant of the compulsory license, 
albeit differing on the interpretations of certain provisions governing compulsory 
licenses under the Patents Act. 
 
1. Brief Background of the Controller General and IPAB Orders 
 
Natco applied to the Controller for grant of a compulsory license to 
manufacture and sell Nexavar in India after Bayer refused to grant a voluntary 
license.48 The application was made under Section 84(1) of the Patents Act49 and 
allowed Bayer to oppose the application.50 The Controller allowed51 Natco's 
application on the grounds that the reasonable requirement of the public in India 
was not met52 and that the patented invention was not available to the public.53 
With regard to whether the patented invention was not worked in the territory of 
India,54 the Controller interpreted “worked in the territory of India” to mean 
“manufactured to a reasonable extent in India.”55  
                                                 
48 Compulsory License Application No. 1 of 2011 (Controller General of Patents, Mar. 9, 2012), 
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/compulsory_license_12032012.pdf. 
49 Patents Act, § 84(1) (1970), http://www.liiofindia.org/in/legis/cen/num_act/pa1970109/. 
50 Patents (Amendment) Act, § 87 (2002), http://www.liiofindia.org/in/legis/cen/num_act/pa2002189/ 
(states the procedure for consideration of applications under Section 84 and 85 of the Patents Act).  
Section 87 : Procedure for dealing with applications under sections 84 and 85- 
(1) Where the Controller is satisfied, upon consideration of an application under section 84, 
or section 85, that a prima facie case has been made out for the making of an order, he shall 
direct the applicant to serve copies of the application upon the patentee and any other person 
appearing from the register to be interested in the patent in respect of which the application 
is made, and shall publish the application in the official journal. 
(2) The patentee or any other person desiring to oppose the application may, within such 
time as may be prescribed or within such further time as the Controller may on application 
(made either before or after the expiration of the prescribed time) allow, give to the 
Controller notice of opposition. 
(3) Any such notice of opposition shall contain a statement setting out the grounds on which 
the application is opposed. 
(4) Where any such notice of opposition is duly given, the Controller shall notify the 
applicant, and shall give to the applicant and the opponent an opportunity to be heard before 
deciding the case. 
51 Controller General of Patents, supra note 4848 at 60. 
52 Patents (Amendment) Act, § 84(1)(a) (2002) (amended 2005), 
http://www.liiofindia.org/in/legis/cen/num_act/pa2002189/. 
53 Patents (Amendment) Act, § 84(1)(b) (2002) (amended 2005), 
http://www.liiofindia.org/in/legis/cen/num_act/pa2002189/. 
54 Patents (Amendment) Act, § 84(1)(c) (2002) (amended 2005), 
http://www.liiofindia.org/in/legis/cen/num_act/pa2002189/. 
55 Controller General of Patents, supra note 46, at 43. 
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Bayer appealed the order of the Controller before the Intellectual Property 
Appellate Board (IPAB). However, the IPAB upheld the Controller's order 
granting the compulsory license.56 It is pertinent to note that the IPAB differed 
with the Controller's order on the interpretation of the term "worked in the territory 
of India."57 The IPAB was of the opinion that the requirement of working on the 
patented drug in India did not necessarily mean that the drug ought to be 
manufactured in India; the requirement could also be fulfilled by importing the 
patented drug to India.58  
 
2. Order of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court 
 
Aggrieved, Bayer moved on to the Bombay High Court with a writ of certiorari 
seeking to quash the order from IPAB into which the order of the Controller had 
been merged. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court upheld the order of 
the IPAB, thus maintaining Natco’s compulsory license.59  
The following are some of the important issues framed by the Division 
Bench of the Bombay High Court in order to decide the writ filed by Bayer: 
a. Whether Bayer has satisfied the reasonable requirements of the 
public under Section 84(1)(b) of the Act?60 
b. Whether the patented drug is available to the public at a reasonably 
affordable price?61 
c. Whether the patented drug has been worked in the territory of 
India?62  
d. Whether the terms and conditions for grant of compulsory license 
were proper under Section 90 of the Act?63 
 
3. Bombay High Court's Reasoning and Judgment  
 
a. Reasonable Requirement of the Public 
 
i. Burden of Proof 
 
Bayer argued that the initial burden to make out a prima facie case for the 
grant of a compulsory license was on Natco and that Natco had failed to do so.64 
The Division Bench agreed that the initial burden is on the applicant who makes 
an application for a compulsory license to establish a prima facie, but it held that 
Natco was able to make such a showing to the satisfaction of the Controller 
General.65 
                                                 
56 Bayer Corporation v. Union of India, No. 45 of 2013 (IPAB Mar. 4, 2013), 
http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-45-2013.pdf. 
57 Id. at ¶ 23. 
58 Id. at ¶ 52. 
59 Bayer Corporation vs. Union of India, (2014) 60 PTC 277 (Bombay HC). 
60 Id. at ¶ 13. 
61 Id. at ¶ 14. 
62 Id. at ¶ 15. 
63 Id. at ¶ 17. 
64 Id. at ¶ 13. 
65 Id. 
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ii. Quantum of Drug Required by the Public 
 
The Division Bench observed that it was not possible to determine the 
reasonable requirement of the public without ascertaining the exact quantum of the 
patented drug required by the public.66 The Division Bench held that such an 
exercise cannot be carried out on a mathematical basis but has to be determined 
based on the evidence provided by the parties.67 The parties had, before the IPAB 
and the Controller, relied upon the Globocan 2008 data68 to determine the 
incidence of patients suffering from cancer in India. The Division Bench held that 
the reasonable requirements of the public ought to be determined based on this 
data.69 The Division Bench also took into consideration Bayer's country medical 
director's affidavit that illustrated that the quantum of drugs sold was not in 
consonance with the quantum of patients requiring the drug.70 Thus, the Division 
Bench upheld the determination by the Controller General and the IPAB that the 

























                                                 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at ¶ 12. 
68 INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, GLOBOCAN 2008: Cancer Incidence and 
Mortality Worldwide (May 1, 2010), https://www.iarc.fr/en/media-
centre/iarcnews/2010/globocan2008.php (a project undertaken by the International Agency for 
Research on Cancer under the aegis of the World Health organization aimed at providing contemporary 
estimates of the incidence of mortality and prevalence of major types of cancer at the national level for 
184 countries of the world).  
69 Bayer Corporation vs. Union of India, (2014) 60 PTC 277 (Bombay HC) at ¶13. 
70 Id.  
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iii. Infringer's Supply 
 
The Division Bench rejected Bayer's argument that supplies of the anti-
cancer drug by other infringers, including Cipla, a major Indian multinational 
pharmaceutical company, should also be considered to determine the satisfaction 
of the reasonable requirement test.71 Bayer contended that in order to determine 
whether the reasonable requirement of public was met with respect to the patented 
invention, supplies of the patent drug undertaken by other infringers such as Cipla 
also need to be taken into account.72 The Bench held that the obligation to meet the 
reasonable requirement of the public rests upon the patentee, either alone or 
through its licensees. Section 146 of the Indian Patents Act and Rule 131 of the 
Indian Patents Rules require patentees to report annually73 on the extent to which 
“the patented invention has been commercially worked in India.”74 IPAB had 
reasoned that since Bayer had not included Cipla’s sale of the patented drug in 
Bayer’s reporting, the extent to which Cipla supplied the market should not be 
taken into account.75 The Division Bench essentially agreed with this reasoning 
























                                                 
71 Id. at ¶13(d). 
72 Id.  
73 Patentees fulfill the annual reporting obligation by completing and submitting to the Controller of 
Patents Form 27, “Statement Regarding the Working of the Patented Invention on Commercial Scale in 
India.” 
74 Patents Act, § 146(1) (1970), http://www.liiofindia.org/in/legis/cen/num_act/pa1970109/. 
75 Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, No. 45 of 2013 (IPAB Mar. 4, 2013), 
http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-45-2013.pdf at ¶ 13(d), supra note 44. 
76 Id.  
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iv. Interpretation of "Adequate Extent" 
 
As mentioned above, Section 84(1)(a) of the Patents Act provides that 
any interested party may apply for a compulsory license if “the reasonable 
requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been 
satisfied.”77 Section 84(7)(a)(ii) specifies that the reasonable requirements are 
deemed not to have been satisfied if “the demand for the patented article has not 
been met to an adequate extent . . . .” (emphasis added). The Division Bench was 
thus faced for the first time with having to interpret the term “adequate extent.”78 It 
held that with regard to medicines, the adequate extent test has to be 100%, i.e. to 
the fullest extent.79 Referring to the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health (Doha Declaration), adopted on November 14, 2001,80 the Bench 
held that adequate extent for medicines had to be interpreted as medicines being 
made available to every patient.81 Thus, the Bench held that in the instant case, 
Bayer did not meet the requirements of all the patients.82      
 
b. Reasonably Affordable Price 
 
i. Controller's Obligation under Section 90(1)(iii) 
 
The Division Bench upheld the order of the IPAB and the Controller that 
the patented drug was not made available to the public at a reasonably affordable 
price.83 Bayer contended that under Section 90(1)(iii) of the Patents Act,84 there 
exists an obligation on the Controller to determine the reasonably affordable price 
of the patented drug.85 The Division Bench however, rejected the contention and 
held that the Patents Act does not bestow any such powers of investigation on the 
authorities to determine the reasonably affordable price of a patented drug.86 The 
Division Bench held that the evidence as introduced by the parties would form the 
basis of determining reasonably affordable prices.87 The Division Bench also held 
that the reasonably affordable price has to be determined on the basis of the 
relative price being offered by the patent holder and the applicant after hearing 
other interested parties opposing the application.88 Applying this principle, the 
Division Bench compared the prices89 at which Bayer and Natco sold Nexavar and 
held that Bayer did not sell the drug at a reasonably affordable price.90 
                                                 
77 Patents (Amendment) Act, § 84(1)(a) (2002) (amended 2005), 
http://www.liiofindia.org/in/legis/cen/num_act/pa2002189/. 
78 Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, No. 45 of 2013 (IPAB Mar. 4, 2013), 
http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-45-2013.pdf at ¶ 13(f). 
79 Id.  
80 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Nov. 11, 
2001), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm. 
81 Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, No. 45 of 2013 (IPAB Mar. 4, 2013), 
http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-45-2013.pdf at ¶ 13(f). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at ¶14 
84 Patents (Amendment) Act, § 90(1) (2002) (amended 2005), 
http://www.liiofindia.org/in/legis/cen/num_act/pa2002189/.  
Terms and conditions of compulsory licences. – 
(1) In settling the terms and conditions of a licence under section 84, the Controller shall endeavour to 
secure- 
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ii. R&D Costs in Developing Drug  
 
The Bench held that under Section 90(1) of the Patents Act, in 
determining whether the patented drug was available to the public at a reasonable 
price, only the expenditure incurred for research and development on the patented 
drug should be taken into account and not costs incurred in respect of research and 
development on failed drugs.91 Bayer had asserted that in determining whether the 
patented drug was available to the public at a reasonable price, the price of the 
patented drug should be such that the costs incurred in respect of research and 












                                                                                                                
(i) that the royalty and other remuneration, if any, reserved to the patentee or other person 
beneficially entitled to the patent, is reasonable, having regard to the nature of the invention, 
the expenditure incurred by the patentee in making the invention or in developing it and 
obtaining a patent and keeping it in force and other relevant factors; 
(ii) that the patented invention is worked to the fullest extent by the person to whom the 
licence is granted and with reasonable profit to him; 
(iii) that the patented articles are made available to the public at reasonably affordable 
prices; 
(iv) that the licence granted is a non-exclusive licence; 
(v) that the right of the licensee is non-assignable; 
(vi) that the licence is for the balance term of the patent unless a shorter term is consistent 
with public interest; 
(vii) that the licence is granted with a predominant purpose of supply in the Indian market 
and that the licensee may also export the patented product, if need be in accordance with the 
provisions of sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (7) of section 84; 
(viii) that in the case of semi-conductor technology, the licence granted is to work the 
invention for public non-commercial use; 
(ix) that in case the licence is granted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or 
administrative process to be anti-competitive, the licensee shall be permitted to export the 
patented product, if need be. 
 
85 Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, No. 45 of 2013 (IPAB Mar. 4, 2013), 
http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-45-2013.pdf, at ¶ 14. 
86 Id.  
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Bayer sold the drug at about 4260 USD (2,84,000 INR) for a month’s therapy as opposed to Natco’s 
price of 132 USD (8,800 INR) for a month’s therapy. 
90 Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, No. 45 of 2013 (IPAB Mar. 4, 2013), 
http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-45-2013.pdf, at ¶ 14. 
91 Id.  
92 Id. 
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iii. Adverse Inference against Bayer  
 
The Division Bench noted Bayer’s omission of audited accounts 
establishing the amount spent on research and development of the patented drug.93 
It concluded that Bayer had failed to produce the best evidence before the 
authorities and thus held that an adverse inference had to be drawn against 
Bayer.94 On the issue of the expenditure incurred for research and development, 
Natco asserted that about fifty percent of Bayer’s expenditure incurred for research 
and development of the patented drug qualified for reimbursement either by tax 
credit or otherwise due to the drug’s classification as an orphan drug95 in the U.S.96  
 
iv. Importance of Patient Assistant Program (PAP) Schemes 
 
 The role of PAP schemes that subsidize costs to certain patients was 
considered and rejected by the Division Bench. Bayer argued that under its PAP 
scheme, if a patient buys three dosages (12 tablets) of Nexavar, the remaining 
tablets (108 tablets) for the month were provided free of cost, and suggested that 
the patented drug was available to the public at a reasonably affordable price. 
Natco responded that the special price under PAP was only given to particular 
patients on the recommendation of the doctor and at the discretion of Bayer. The 
Division Bench concurred with Natco and held that the patented drug ought to be 
available to any member of the public at a reasonably affordable price. Thus, the 
Division Bench held that the price under PAP was an exceptional price and not the 

















                                                 
93 Id.  
94 Id.  
95 Orphan Drug Act § 316.3(b)(10) & (11), 21 CFR Part 316 (2016) 
("(10) Orphan drug means a drug intended for use in a rare disease or condition as defined in section 
526 of the act. 
(11) Orphan-drug designation means FDA's act of granting a request for designation under section 
526 of the act."). 
96 Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, No. 45 of 2013 (IPAB Mar. 4, 2013), 
http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-45-2013.pdf at ¶ 14. 
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c. Worked in the territory of India      
 
 The Bench held that when a patent holder is faced with an application for 
a compulsory license, it is for the patent holder to show that the patented invention 
is worked in the territory of India by manufacture or import. The Bench also 
clarified that manufacture in all cases may not be necessary to establish working in 
India. However, the Bench held that given the mandate under Section 83 of the 
Act, which is directed to “General principles applicable to working of patented 
invention,”97 the patent holder would have to satisfy the authorities under the Act 
as to why the patented invention was not being manufactured in India. Bayer 
argued that in light of Article 27 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which states that there can be no 
discrimination in respect of a patented product whether locally manufactured or 
imported,98 the patented drug Nexavar has been worked in India. Further, Bayer 
referred to the reporting requirement (Form 27) prescribed in Section 146 of the 
Act and Section 131 of the Rules, wherein the patent holder while giving details of 
the patented drug in India, has to make a declaration of working in India of the 
patented product. Bayer asserted that the information to be submitted in the form 
is divided into two classifications, namely, “manufacture in India” and “imported 
from other countries,” and thus working the patent product in the territory of India 
does not exclusively mean manufacture of the patented product in India. In light of 
the above, Bayer contended that imported supply of goods within the territory 
would amount to working of the patent in India. The Respondents, the Union 
[Government] of India, opposed Bayer's contention on the ground that for the 
purposes of working in India, the patented drug has to be manufactured in India. It 
is pertinent to note that this contention of the Union of India, although accepted by 
the Controller General, was rejected by the IPAB. 
                                                 
97See Intellectual Property India,  
“Section 83. General principles applicable to working of patented inventions 
Without prejudice to the other provisions contained in this Act, in exercising the powers conferred by 
this Chapter, regard shall be had to the following general considerations, namely,— 
(a) that patents are granted to encourage inventions and to secure that the inventions are worked in 
India on a commercial scale and to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable without undue delay; 
(b) that they are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for the importation of the 
patented article; 
(c) that the protection and enforcement of patent rights contribute to the promotion of technological 
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers 
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and 
to a balance of rights and obligations; 
(d) that patents granted do not impede protection of public health and nutrition and should act as 
instrument to promote public interest specially in sectors of vital importance for socio-economic and 
technological development of India; 
(e) that patents granted do not in any way prohibit Central Government in taking measures to protect 
public health; 
(f) that the patent right is not abused by the patentee or person deriving title or interest on patent from 
the patentee, and the patentee or a person deriving title or interest on patent from the patentee does not 
resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology; and 
(g) that patents are granted to make the benefit of the patented invention available at reasonably 
affordable prices to the public.” 
98 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf.  
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The Bench, referring to Section 83 of the Act, held that some efforts to 
manufacture in India should be made by the patent holder. Further, referring to 
Form 27, the Bench agreed with the interpretation by the IPAB that whether a 
patent has been worked in the territory of India has to be determined on a case-to-
case basis.  
 
d. Terms and Conditions for the Grant of a Compulsory License 
 
Section 90 of the Act states among other terms that the Controller has to 
ensure that the royalty and other remuneration paid to the patent holder should 
reasonably cover the expenses incurred by the patent holder in making or 
developing the patented invention.99 In this regard it is pertinent to note that the 
Controller General fixed the royalty rate to be paid by Natco to Bayer at 6% of the 
net sales made by Natco. This figure was arrived at by the Controller General on 
the basis of the United Nations Development Programme Report, which 
recommends that the normal rate of royalty should be at 4% of the net sales. The 
IPAB however, increased the royalty rate to 7% of the net sales. It was this 
determination of the royalty rate that Bayer averred to be insufficient and contrary 
to Section 90 of the Act.  
The Bench held that Bayer failed to adduce any evidence to show in what 
manner the royalty rate of 7% of the net sales was inadequate. Further, the Bench 
observed that Bayer failed to introduce any evidence on the cost incurred by Bayer 
to develop Nexavar. Hence, in light of the fact that Bayer failed to adduce 
evidence to show that the terms of the compulsory license were contrary to Section 







                                                                                                                
Article 27 Patentable Subject Matter 
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an 
inventive step and are capable of industrial application. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, 
paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent rights 
enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether 
products are imported or locally produced. 
2.  Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the 
commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that 
such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law. 
3.  Members may also exclude from patentability: 
(a)  diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals; 
(b)  plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for 
the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. 
However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by 
an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. The provisions of this 
subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement.”). 
99 Supra note, 48 at 90(1)(i). 
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e. Supreme Court on the Nexavar Compulsory License 
 
Bayer filed a Special Leave Petition to the Supreme Court India100 to 
appeal against the order of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. 
However, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, thereby upholding the grant 
of the compulsory license.  
The compulsory license application for Nexavar is the only case which 
has been examined at all judicial levels, from the Controller to the IPAB, the High 
Court and the Supreme Court of India. The Division Bench of the Bombay High 
Court elaborated and clarified several provisions pertaining to the compulsory 
license regime in India. The Division Bench also emphasized that the proceedings 
under Section 84 of the Act are in public interest, and that public interest is 
fundamental in deciding a matter of compulsory licensing with respect to 
medicines or drugs.  
 
D. Other Recent Compulsory License Attempts 
 
Following the Nexavar case, India’s tryst with compulsory license has 
continued. In March 2013, BDR Pharmaceuticals International Pvt. Ltd. (BDR) 
filed an application for a compulsory license for Bristol-Myers Squibb's (BMS) 
anti-cancer drug Dasatinib (Indian Patent No. 203937), sold under the brand name 
Sprycel. However, on October 29, 2013, the Controller rejected101 the application, 
mainly on the ground that BDR did not undertake enough effort to obtain a 
voluntary license on reasonable terms and conditions from BMS for the drug. The 
Controller’s decision made clear that it is a statutory mandate under Section 
84(6)(iv) of the Act for an applicant to make efforts to obtain a voluntary license 
before seeking a compulsory license.  
The latest compulsory license episode recently unfolded with the 
Controller of Patents rejecting a compulsory license application filed by Lee 
Pharma Ltd. (“Lee Pharma”), a Hyderabad-based pharmaceutical manufacturer, 
for AstraZeneca AB’s (“Astrazeneca”) anti-diabetic drug Saxagliptin (Indian 
Patent No. 206543), sold under the brand name Onglyza, by order dated January 
19, 2016.  
                                                 
100 A Special Leave Petition is roughly analogous to a petition for a writ of certiorari filed with the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
101 Compulsory License Application No. 1 of 2013; Controller General of Patents, Order Dated October 
29th, 2013. 
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Lee Pharma sought a compulsory license on the grounds that the 
reasonable requirements of the public with respect to Saxagliptin were not being 
satisfied; that Saxagliptin was not available to the public at a reasonably affordable 
price; and that Saxagliptin was not being worked in India. The Controller, in a 
detailed order102 analyzed each ground and held that Lee Pharma failed to establish 
a prima facie case under any of them. Essentially, the Controller held there existed 
other DPP-IV inhibitors, such as Linagliptin, Vildagliptin and Sitagliptin, which 
were being concurrently prescribed by Indian doctors. Moreover, the Controller 
took into consideration the submission that 90% of patients were prescribed DPP-
IV inhibitors other than Saxagliptin. The Controller also noted that the other DPP 
IV inhibitors, despite their greater volume of sales, were priced the same as that of 
Saxagliptin. The Controller thus held that if the other similarly-priced DPP IV 
inhibitors were arguably affordable, then, without any evidence to the contrary, it 
could not be held that Saxagliptin was being sold at an excessively high price in 
India.  
Further, the Controller also reiterated the ruling of the Bombay High 
Court in the Nexavar case that manufacturing in India is not a necessary pre-
condition to show working in India; however, the patentee is required to establish 
reasons that prevent the patentee from manufacturing in India. Accordingly, the 
Controller held that Lee Pharma failed to show any report, evidence or study that 
established the number of patients requiring Saxagliptin and therefore whether 
there existed any shortage in supply of the drug. The lack of such data from Lee 
Pharma was held by the Controller insufficient to establish necessity of 




It appears that the jurisprudence on the compulsory licensing regime is 
now settled in India. The analysis by the IPAB and the Bombay High Court in the 
Nexavar application has provided clarity on the scope of the grounds for granting a 
compulsory license under Section 84 of the Patents Act. Essentially the grounds 
for seeking a compulsory license under Section 84 are that the reasonable 
requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been 
satisfied, or that the patented invention is not available to the public at a 
reasonably affordable price, or that the patented invention has not been worked in 
the territory of India. While there may be due process concerns owing to unclear 
wording regarding the Patent Act’s other compulsory licensing provisions (such as 
Section 92A), the Indian Judiciary has established specific conditions for issuing 
compulsory licenses under Section 84 of the Act, and it thereby seems to have 
allayed fears that compulsory licensing will be used as a tool to undermine patent 
rights. 
                                                 
102 Compulsory License Application No.1 of 2015; Controller General of Patents, Order Dated 
January19th, 2016. 
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Clause 105 of the Patents Bill 1953103 empowered the Controller of 
Patents to seek, from patentees or exclusive licensees, information pertaining to 
the commercial working of their patented inventions in India. Justice Ayyangar 
embraced this provision in his recommendations and called for “setting up of a 
unit in the Commerce Ministry for [obtaining information as regards the working 
of patents].”104 Justice Ayyangar dismissed concerns that such a provision would 
be “burden rather than an advantage” and that “compliance with the provisions of 
this clause would compel manufacturers to disclose their trade secrets.”105 Instead, 
he opined that “particulars as to working of the invention would be useful for 
statistical purposes as at present no estimate can be made of the extent to which 
patents are being worked.”106 Further, Justice Ayyangar sought to expand the 
powers of the controller to seek the requisite working information from not just the 
patentees or exclusive licensees, but also from non-exclusive licensees.107 
The recommendations of Justice Ayyangar with respect to working 
statements were incorporated as Section 146 of the Patents Act 1970.108 In 
addition, the Patents Act 1970 imposed a statutory requirement on patentees and 
their licensees (exclusive or otherwise) to “furnish in such manner and form and at 
such intervals (not being less than six months) as may be prescribed statements as 
to the extent to which the patented invention has been worked on a commercial 
scale in India.”109 Section 146(2) of the Patents Act 1970, read in conjunction with 
section 131 of the Patent Rules 2003,110 currently mandates that patentees and 
their licensees provide information on the working of patented inventions in India 
for the preceding calendar year on or before March 31 of the subsequent year in a 
format as prescribed by Form 27. 
As discussed earlier, non-working of a patented invention is not only a 
ground for the grant of a compulsory license, but for the revocation of the patent 
itself.111 Consequently, the submission of working statements under Section 
146(2) of the Patents Act 1970 and section 131 of the Patent Rules 2003 is critical 
to maintain a patent in force in India. It is significant to note that the working 
statements filed by Bayer for the patented drug Nexavar played a crucial role in 
ascertaining whether the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the 
patented invention had been satisfied as per section 84(a) of the Patents Act.112 
                                                 
103 The Patents Bill 1953, supra note 14 at Cl. 105 
Power of Controller to call for information from patentee—The Controller may, at any time during the 
continuance of the patent by notice in writing require a patentee or an exclusive licensee to furnish to 
him within two months from the date of such notice or within such further time as the Controller may 
allow, such information and such periodical statements as to the extent to which the patent has been 
commercially worked in India, as may be specified in the notice. 
104 Ayyangar, supra note 7 at ¶ 167. 
105 Id. at ¶ 838. 
106 Id. at ¶ 840. 
107 Id. at ¶¶ 842–844. 
108 Patents Act 1970, supra note 20 at § 146. 
109 Id. at § 146(2). 
110 The Patent Rules 2003, at § 131. 
111 See supra note 29-30 and accompanying text. 
112 Id.  
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More recently, a public interest writ petition has been filed before the 
Delhi High court “to compel patentees and licensees to comply with the statutory 
mandate to declare information on the working of their patents, as per the Patents 
Act, 1970 & Rules thereunder.”113 The petition alleged “a blatant disregard for an 
important statutory mandate, with close to 35% of the patentees failing to disclose 
their patent working status during 2009 to 2012.”114 The petition further contended 
that even in instances where a working statement had been filed, “the disclosures 
[…] were either incomplete, negligent, or incomprehensible.”115 The petition 
sought the Court to direct the Patent Office to enforce the statutory provisions with 
respect to commercial working of patented inventions in India and to form a 
committee to review the format of the information being collected in Form 27 so 
as to fulfill its objectives.116 The matter was scheduled for further hearings in the 
summer of 2016. 
 
IV. EXCLUSIONS FROM PATENTABILITY 
 
As discussed earlier, the Patents Bill 1953, for the first time, included an 
enumerated list of what is not patentable (see below). However, as the bill died on 
the floor of the house, the list remained outside the purview of the Indian Patent 
Laws until 1970. 
Section 3 of the Patents Bill 1953 
3. What is not patentable.—The following shall 
not be patentable under this Act.— 
(a) an invention the use of which would be 
contrary to law or morality; 
(b) the mere discovery of new properties of a 
known substance; 
(c) a mere duplication of known devices or 
juxtaposition of known devices which function 
independently of one another; 
(d) a substance prepared or produced by a 
chemical process or intended for food or 
medicine other than a substance prepared or 
produced by any method or process of 
manufacture particularly described in the 
complete specification of the invention or by its 
obvious chemical equivalent. 
Explanation.—In relation to a substance 
intended for food or medicine, a mere 
admixture resulting only in the aggregation of 
the known properties of the ingredients of that 
substance shall not be deemed to be a method 
or process of manufacture. 
 
                                                 
113 See Shamnad Basheer vs. Union of India and others, at E, W.P.(C) 5590/2015.  
114 Id.  
115 Id. at E-F. 
116 Id. at 1. 
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In his Report, Justice Ayyangar was unequivocal in his support for the 
statute “specifying with clarity which ‘inventions’ alone are patentable and which 
‘inventions’ should not be patentable.”117 He reasoned that positively identifying 
patentable and non-patentable inventions would “(1) eliminate ambiguity and (2) 
prescribe in precise terms inventions for which patents should be refused in the 
interests of either of national economy or national health or well-being.”118 
Accordingly, the Report recommended revisions to Section 3 of the Patents Bill 
1953 to include an “exhaustive enumeration” of what is not patentable.119 He also 
proposed to explicitly exclude food and medicinal products as well as products of 
chemical processes, while at the same time allowing patents to be granted for 
chemical processes themselves.120 Justice Ayyangar’s focus primarily lay on 
patents for chemical products and inventions relating to food and medicine. This 
was hardly surprising considering the state of a 12-year-old nation wishing to 
protect its national interests and to build an industrial economy.  
Moreover, the Report justified most of the exclusions as being “almost 
universally not patentable.”121 The remaining exclusions were to “remove any 
doubt that might exist as regards the patentability of such inventions,”122 or were 
based on the UK Patent Act and/or case law developed in the U.K.123   
The recommendations of the Ayyangar Report for Clause 3 – What is not 
patentable124 - were adopted almost verbatim in the Patents Act 1970 as recitals in 
Sections 3 and 5 (see comparative chart below).125 
 
Justice Ayyangar's recommendations 
for Section 3 
Chapter II of the Patents Act 1970 - 
Inventions not patentable 
3. What is not patentable.—The 
following shall not be patentable under 
this Act and shall be deemed always not 
to have been patentable:— 
3. What are not inventions:- The 
following are not inventions within the 
meaning of this Act,- 
(1)(a) An invention which is frivolous or 
claims anything obviously contrary to 
well established natural laws. 
(a) an invention which is frivolous or 
which claims anything obviously 
contrary to well established natural 
laws; 
(b) An invention the use of which would 
be contrary to law or morality or 
injurious to public health. 
(b) an invention the primary or 
intended use of which would be 
contrary to law or morality or injurious 
to public health; 
(c) The mere discovery of a scientific 
principle or the formulation of an 
abstract theory. 
(c) the mere discovery of a scientific 
principle or the formulation of an 
abstract theory; 
                                                 
117 Id. at ¶ 48. 
118 Id.  
119 Id. at ¶ 327. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at ¶ 330 with respect to paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (g), and (h) of sub clause (I) of Cl. 3. 
122 Id. at ¶ 331. 
123 Id. at ¶¶ 332–35. 
124 Id. 
125 Patents Act of 1970, supra note 20, at §§ 3, 5. 
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(d) Methods of agriculture or 
horticulture. 
(h) a method of agriculture or 
horticulture; 
(e) Processes for medicinal, surgical, 
curative, prophylactic, and other 
treatment of man and processes for 
similar treatment of animals or plants to 
render them free of disease or to increase 
their economic value or that of their 
products. 
(i) any process for the medicinal, 
surgical, curative, prophylactic, or 
other treatment of human beings or 
any process for a similar treatment of 
animals or plants to render them free 
of disease or to increase their 
economic value or that of their 
products; 
(f) A claim to a substance obtained by a 
mere admixture resulting only in the 
aggregation of the properties of the 
components thereof or a process for 
producing such substance. 
(e) a substance obtained by a mere 
admixture resulting only in the 
aggregation of the properties of the 
components thereof or a process for 
producing such substance; 
(g) A mere discovery of any new 
property or new use for a known 
substance, or of the mere new use of a 
known process, machine or apparatus. 
(d) the mere discovery of any new 
property or new use for a known 
substance or of the mere use of a 
known process, machine or apparatus 
unless such known process results in a 
new product or employs at least one 
new reactant; 
(h) A mere arrangement or 
rearrangement or duplication of known 
devices each working in an old or well-
known way. 
(f) the mere arrangement or re-
arrangement or duplication of known 
devices each functioning 
independently of one another in a 
known way; 
---- (g) a method or process of testing 
applicable during the process of 
manufacture for rendering the 
machine, apparatus or other equipment 
more efficient or for the improvement 
or restoration of the existing machine, 
apparatus or other equipment or for the 
improvement or control of 
manufacture; 
(2) No patent shall after the 
commencement of this Act be granted in 
respect of inventions claiming—(a) 
substances intended for or are capable of 
being used as food or beverage or as 
medicine (for men or animals) including 
sera, vaccines, antibiotics and biological 
preparations, insecticide, germicide or 
fungicide, and (b) substances produced 
by chemical processes including alloys 
but excluding glass. 
5. In the case of inventions-(a) 
claiming substances intended for use, 
or capable of being used, as food or as 
medicine or drug, or (b) relating to 
substances prepared or produced by 
chemical processes (including alloys, 
optical glass, semi-conductors and 
inter-metallic compounds), no patent 
shall be granted in respect of claims 
for the substances themselves, 
(3) Notwithstanding anything in sub- 5(b) (cont.) but claims for the methods 
25Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
26 INDIAN PATENT LAW                                          [1: 26] 
 
section (2) inventions of chemical 
processes for the manufacture or 
production of the substances mentioned 
in that subsection shall be patentable.  
or processes of manufacture shall be 
patentable. 
 
---- 4. No patent shall be granted in respect 
of an invention relating to atomic 
energy falling within sub-section (1) of 
section 20 of the Atomic Energy Act, 
1962. 
 
The exclusion list enumerated in the Patents Act 1970 has survived 
relatively unscathed for over four decades. However, the exclusion list received 
much attention in the 2002 and 2005 Amendments. Significantly, the 2002 
Amendments, among others, modified “Section 3 […] to include exclusions 
permitted by TRIPS Agreement and also subject-matters like discovery of any 
living or non-living substances occurring in nature in the list of exclusions which 
in general do not constitute patentable invention.”126 Section 3(g) of the Patents 
Act 1970 was omitted and Sections 3(d) and 3(i) were amended in 2002.127 The list 
of excluded subject matter under Section 3 also grew from 9 to 15 with the 2002 
Amendments with the addition of new sections 3(j) to 3(p). Inventions that are, in 
effect, traditional knowledge or an aggregation or duplication of traditionally 
known component(s) were excluded under Section 3(p). Exclusions relating to 
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work (Section 3(l)) were covered under 
copyrights, while exclusions relating to topography of integrated circuits (Section 
3(o)) were covered under the Semiconductor Integrated Circuits Layout-Design 
Act.128 Other provisions relating to a mere scheme or rule or method for 
performing mental act or method of playing game (Section 3(m)) and presentation 
of information (Section 3(n)) were typically excluded elsewhere in the world.  
                                                 
126 Ayyangar, supra note 7, at ¶ 4(b).  
127 Supra note 4. 
128 See generally, Semiconductor Integrated Circuits Layout-Design Act, 2000, No. 37, Acts of 
Parliament, 2000 (India). 
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 Section 3 of the Indian Patents Act 1970 as 
amended in 2002 
3. What are not inventions.—The following are 
not inventions within the meaning of this 
Act,— 
(a) an invention which is frivolous or which 
claims anything obviously contrary to well 
established natural laws;  
(b) an invention the primary or intended use or 
commercial exploitation of which could be 
contrary to public order or morality or which 
causes serious prejudice to human, animal or 
plant life or health or to the environment; 
(c) the mere discovery of a scientific principle 
or the formulation of an abstract theory or 
discovery of any living thing or non-living 
substance occurring in nature; 
(d) the mere discovery of any new property or 
new use for a known substance or of the mere 
use of a known process, machine or apparatus 
unless such known process results in a new 
product or employs at least one new reactant; 
(e) a substance obtained by a mere admixture 
resulting only in the aggregation of the 
properties of the components thereof or a 
process for producing such substance; 
(f) the mere arrangement or re-arrangement or 
duplication of known devices each functioning 
independently of one another in a known way; 
(g)..(omitted) 
(h) a method of agriculture or horticulture; 
(i) any process for the medicinal, surgical, 
curative, prophylactic diagnostic, therapeutic or 
other treatment of human beings or any process 
for a similar treatment of animals to render 
them free of disease or to increase their 
economic value or that of their products.  
(j) plants and animals in whole or any part 
thereof other than micro- organisms but 
including seeds, varieties and species and 
essentially biological processes for production 
or propagation of plants and animals; 
(k) a mathematical or business method or a 
computer program per se or algorithms;  
(l) a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work 
or any other aesthetic creation whatsoever 
including cinematographic works and television 
productions;  
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(m) a mere scheme or rule or method of 
performing mental act or method of playing 
game; 
(n) a presentation of information; 
(o) topography of integrated circuits; 
(p) an invention which in effect, is traditional 
knowledge or which is an aggregation or 
duplication of known properties of traditionally 
known component or components. 
 
The 2005 Amendments further tweaked the language of section 3(d) and 
repealed section 5 of the Patents Act 1970, to bring us to the exclusion list that is 
in force today. 
Section 3(d) of the Patents Act 1970 as 
amended in 2005 
(d) the mere discovery of a new form of a 
known substance which does not result in the 
enhancement of the known efficacy of that 
substance or the mere discovery of any new 
property or new use for a known substance or 
of the mere use of a known process, machine or 
apparatus unless such known process results in 
a new product or employs at least one new 
reactant. 
Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, 
salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, 
pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of 
isomers, complexes, combinations and other 
derivatives of known substance shall be 
considered to be the same substance, unless 
they differ significantly in properties with 
regard to efficacy; 
 
Of particular interest to this article are the exclusions under sections 3(d), 3(e), and 
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1. Section 3(d) 
 
Chapter II of the Patents Act bears the heading "Inventions Not 
Patentable" and Section 3 has the marginal heading "What are not inventions."129 
As indicated by the Chapter heading and the marginal heading of Section 3, and as 
may be seen simply by going through Section 3, the section combines provisions 
of two different kinds: one that declares that certain things shall not be deemed to 
be "inventions" [for instance Clauses (d) & (e)]; and the other that provides that, 
though resulting from invention, certain things may not be the subject of a patent 
grant for other considerations [for instance Clause (b)].130 
A perusal of the Parliamentary debate surrounding amendments to section 
3(d) would reveal that the whole debate centered on medicines and drugs.131 The 
amendment (by way of addition) in Clause (d) of Section 3 was proposed by the 
Government132 in order to placate the fears of the then Opposition133 concerning 
the introduction of product patents for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals. 
It was on the Government's assurance that the proposed amendment in Section 
3(d) (besides some other changes in the Act) would take care of the apprehensions 
about the abuse of product patents for medicines and agricultural chemical 
substances that the Bill was passed by the Parliament.134  
During the course of Parliamentary debate, issues regarding patentability 
of microorganisms and the definition of “pharmaceutical substance” to mean “a 
new chemical entity” (NCE) or “new medical entity” (NME) were also raised. At 
the assurance of the then Commerce and Industry Minister these issues were 
referred to a Technical Expert Group on Patent Law Issues, which has come to be 
known as the “Mashelkar Committee.”135 
                                                 
129 The Patents Act, supra note 5 at ch. II § 3.  
130 Section 3 (b) an invention the primary or intended use or commercial exploitation of which could be 
contrary to public order or morality or which causes serious prejudice to human, animal or plant life or 
health or to the environment. 
131 Novartis AG (“Novartis”) v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1 ¶ 97 (India). 
132 At the time, the Government was headed by the Congress Party, under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh. 
133 The Opposition was headed by the Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP. 
134 Id. at ¶ 103. 
135 Dr. R. A. Mashelkar, the chair of the committee, served as Director General of the Indian Council of 
Scientific and Industrial Research, an organization that links the country’s publicly funded research 
laboratories and institutions. It is the world’s largest organization of its kind. 
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The Mashelkar Committee was, inter alia, asked to study “whether it 
would be TRIPS compatible to limit the grant of patent for pharmaceutical 
substance to new chemical entity (NCE) or to new medical entity involving one or 
more inventive steps.”136 The Patents Act had not restricted patents to NCEs. 
Therefore, if the Mashelkar Committee had answered the question in the 
affirmative, there would have been pressure on the government to amend the 
Patents Act to provide for a more restrictive definition of patentable subject 
matter. However, as it happened, the Committee observed that it would not be 
TRIPS compatible to limit the grant of a patent for pharmaceuticals to NCEs 
alone, thereby indirectly supporting the argument for section 3(d).137 
The Committee further observed that “every effort must be made to 
prevent the grant of frivolous patents and ‘ever greening.’”138 The Mashelkar 
Committee, in fact, also added that “‘incremental innovations’ involving new 
forms, analogs, etc. but which have significantly better safety and efficacy 
standards, need to be encouraged139.” 
With the promulgation of Section 3(d), an impression was created in the 
minds of a section of the pharmaceutical industry that no incremental innovation 
would be entitled to a patent in India. The notion became further galvanised due to 























                                                 
136 ¶ 2.0 page 2 ‘The Report of the Technical Expert Group – Revised, December 2009’ (commonly 
referred to as Mashelkar committee report, after the chairman of the group) was presented to the 
Government of India on 13 March, 2009 and is available at the website of Department of Industrial 
Policy & Promotion. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. ¶ 4.0. 
139 Id. ¶ 4.0. 
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1. The Novartis Case 
 
a. Novartis’ Patent Application Rejected by Patent Controller 
(January 2006) 
 
In January 2006, the Patent Controller in Chennai,140 in a major decision, 
denied Novartis’ patent application that claimed a variation of the company’s anti-
leukemia drug marketed as Gleevec (or Glivec). 141 The application was for the 
beta-crystalline form of imatinib mesylate.142 Novartis had previously obtained a 
patent in the United States for the drug imatinib, which also covered 
pharmaceutically acceptable salts.143 Novartis then obtained regulatory (FDA) 
approval in the United States for the marketing of a salt form of the drug called 
imatinib mesylate.144 The application before the Patent Controller in Chennai was 
for a specific form of the imatinib mesylate salt – the beta crystalline form.145  
Examination of the application began in the Chennai branch of the Indian 
Patent Office in 2005.146 By then, the application had already become the subject 
of considerable controversy. Advocacy groups (including the Cancer Patients Aid 
Association (CPAA)), and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers, filed pre-grant 
oppositions contending that the application lacked novelty, was obvious, and was 
not patentable under section 3(d).147 The Patent Controller agreed and rejected the 
application.148 
The patent rejection meant that other companies could manufacture and 
market generic versions of the drug and make imatinib mesylate available at less 
than one-tenth of Novartis’ price. 
                                                 
140 The Indian Patent Office is divided among four cities. The head office is in Kolkata, and branch 
offices are located in Chennai, New Delhi and Mumbai. The Office of the Controller General of 
Patents, Designs and Trade Marks is in Mumbai. See Novartis AG v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 1. 
judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40212. 
141 Novartis sold the drug at about 266.67 USD (12,000 INR) for a month’s therapy as opposed to the 
price offered by other generic manufacturers of about 177.78 to 222.23 USD (8,000 to 10,000 INR) for 
a month’s therapy. 
142 Id. at 8. 
143 Id.  
144 Id.  
145 Id.  
146 Novartis initially filed its patent application in 1997, but as patent law in the country at the time was 
undergoing a transition, the patent application lay dormant under an arrangement called “mailbox 
procedure” and the application was taken out of the ‘mailbox’ for consideration only after amendments 
were made w.e.f. January 1, 2005. Id. at ¶ 13–23 at 8–9. 
147 Id. at 23. 
148 Id. 
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In June 2006, Novartis AG and its Indian subsidiary, Novartis India, filed 
a series of writ petitions against the Government of India, CPAA, and four Indian 
generic manufacturers (Natco, Cipla, Hetero and Ranbaxy), before the Madras 
High Court.149 These writ petitions challenged the decision of the Patent Controller 
declining the grant of a patent to Novartis, and they also challenged the validity of 
section 3(d), which was one among several grounds relied upon by the Controller 
in the refusal order.150 Novartis contended that section 3(d) was not in compliance 
with Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, which requires WTO-member 
countries to grant patents “in all fields of technology” and “without discrimination 
as to… the field of technology.”151 It also made the constitutional argument that 
the use of the term “efficacy” in section 3(d) was vague and ambiguous, and 
therefore violated the equality provision (Article 14) of the Indian Constitution.152 
Over a period of time, the writ petitions challenging the decision of the 
Patent Controller were converted into statutory appeals by a statutory 
amendment153 to the Patents Act. The amendment, which added Chapter XIX, 
Sections 116 to 117H, extended the jurisdiction of the Intellectual Property 
Appellate Board under Section 83 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, to include 
jurisdiction, power, and authority to hear appeals from orders of the Controller 
under Section 15 of the Patents Act. 154 On the basis of that amendment, in April 
2007, the Government of India notified the IPAB to hear appeals relating to 
patents and consequently, Novartis’ appeals were transferred to the IPAB.155 
 
b. Constitutional Validity of Section 3(d) Upheld by Madras High 
Court (August 2007) 
 
Meanwhile, in August 2007, the Madras High Court issued its decision156 
rejecting Novartis’ writ petitions challenging the validity of section 3(d). The 
Madras High Court refused to examine whether section 3(d) was in compliance 
with the TRIPS Agreement, concluding that such questions were for the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body provided under Article 64 of the 
TRIPS Agreement.157 
                                                 
149 Id. at 15. 
150 Id. at 15. 
151 27(1) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property art. 27.1, Apr. 15th, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/trips_02_e.htm 
[hereinafter TRIPs]; NAFTA art. 1709.1.  
152 Article 14 provides that, “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal 
protection of the laws within the territory of India.” INDIA CONST. art. 14.  
153 Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, Act No. 38 of 2002 w.e.f April 2, 2007.  
154 Id.  
155 Novartis AG v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 1. 
judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40212. 
156 (2007) 4 MLJ 1153. 
157 Id.  
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With respect to its constitutional argument, Novartis conceded during the 
oral proceedings that the meaning of the term “efficacy” was known, but it 
contended that because there was no clarity as to what constituted “enhancement 
of efficacy” and “significant enhancement of efficacy” as required by section 3(d), 
the law was vague and lent itself to arbitrary decisions by the Patent Controller.158 
The Government of India, CPAA and generic companies argued that section 3(d) 
was not in violation of the equality provision of the Indian Constitution as the 
concept of efficacy is well-known to persons in the pharmaceutical industry and it 
is impossible to lay down a “one size fits all” standard to determine what 
constitutes a significant enhancement of efficacy.159 Dismissing the petition, the 
Madras High Court held that section 3(d) was not vague or arbitrary and therefore 
did not violate the Indian Constitution.160 It held that the term “efficacy” was 
known in the pharmaceutical field to mean “therapeutic efficacy.”161 
 While dismissing Novartis’ writ petitions, the Madras High Court held: 
“We have borne in mind the object which the Amending Act wanted to achieve, 
namely, to prevent ever-greening; to provide easy access to the citizens of this 
country to life saving drugs and to discharge their Constitutional obligation of 
providing good health care to its citizens.162”  
While Novartis AG did not challenge the judgment of the Madras High 
Court upholding the constitutional validity of section 3(d), it did argue against the 
dismissal of its patent application before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board 
(IPAB). 
 
c. Appeal on Merits Rejected on the Ground of Section 3(d) by 
IPAB (June 2009)  
 
After a series of procedures in which Novartis contested the constitution 
of the IPAB, Novartis’ appeal challenging the Patent Controller’s order was finally 
heard by a specially constituted Bench of the IPAB in November and December 
2008. 
In its decision issued in June 2009, the IPAB overturned the Patent 
Controller’s findings on novelty and inventive step and held that the beta-
crystalline form of imatinib mesylate was new and involved an inventive step.163 
However, the IPAB held that Novartis’ alleged invention did not satisfy 
the test of section 3(d) because Novartis did not provide data to show that the beta-
crystalline form of imatinib mesylate exhibited significantly enhanced therapeutic 
efficacy over imatinib mesylate, the known substance.164  





162 Id. at 19.  
163 IPAB Order No. 100 of 2009 dated 26th June, 2009. Order (No.100/2009) of the Intellectual 
Property Appellate Board, dated 26th June, 2009 https://www.scrib.com/document/133340456/IPAB-
Order-Ddataed-26-Jun-2009-in-Norvatis-v-Union-of-India. 
164 Id. at 14. 
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Primarily on the basis of this finding, the IPAB rejected Novartis’ appeal 
and refused to grant it a patent for the beta-crystalline form of imatinib 
mesylate.165 
 
d. Proceedings Before the Supreme Court 
 
Challenging the IPAB’s order, Novartis approached the Supreme Court 
directly by filing a special leave petition challenging the IPAB’s interpretation and 
application of section 3(d).166 Subsequently, CPAA and Natco filed cross-petitions 
challenging the IPAB’s findings on other issues including novelty and inventive 
step.167 
 
i. Issues Involved 
  
The Supreme Court considered the following questions: Is Imatinib Mesylate, the 
salt version of the free base form of Imatinib, an invention that is patentable under 
Indian law?168 Is the beta crystalline version of Imatinib Mesylate an invention 
patentable under Indian law?169 
In answering the first question, the Supreme Court had to determine, inter 
alia, whether the mesylate salt form of imatinib had been disclosed in the prior art 
(in this case, a US patent referred to as the Zimmerman patent) and was publicly 
known. On the basis of the prior art cited, the Supreme Court examined the issue 
of patentability de novo and found that the mesylate salt form of imatinib was 
disclosed.170  
                                                 
165 Id. at 151. 
166 Novartis AG v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 1. 
judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40212. 
167 Id.  
168 Id. at 3. 
169 Id. at 3. 
170 (a)   The principal prior art was the Zimmermann patent (US Patent No. 5,521,184). The application 
for grant of the Zimmermann patent in the US specified that the invention related to derivatives of N-
phenyl-2-pyrimidne-amine, one of which was imatinib and its compounds. The application further 
stated that the compounds of the derivatives included their respective salts. The application also stated 
that the invention was in relation to the treatment of tumors in warm-blooded animals by administering 
a compound or its pharmaceutically acceptable salt to such animals. 
(b)  The beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate was later patented in the US in 2005. However, the 
drug Gleevec was launched in the market on the basis of the Zimmermann patent itself much before 
2005. Novartis’ application before the Food and Drug Administration, USA stated that the active 
ingredient in the drug for treatment of patients suffering from Chronic Myeloid Leukemia was imatinib 
mesylate and that the Zimmermann patent covered this drug. 
(c)  When Novartis applied for a patent for the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate in the US, the 
Board of Patent Appeals held that there was a presumption that the Zimmermann patent teaches a 
person skilled in the art, the manner of use of Imatinib or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof in 
the treatment of tumors in warm blooded animals. 
(d)  When Natco Pharma Limited marketed a drug called Veenat 100 in the UK, Novartis issued a legal 
notice against Natco pointing out that the active pharmaceutical ingredient of Veenat 100 was imatinib 
mesylate, which was covered by the Zimmermann patent in Europe. As a result, the Court found that 
the mesylite salt form of imatinib had been disclosed and was covered by the Zimmermann patent. 
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With regard to the second issue, the Supreme Court observed that the beta 
crystalline form of imatinib mesylate, being a polymorph of imatinib mesylate, 
was directly covered under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act.171 Novartis contended 
that any invention that met the requirements of novelty and inventive step under 
Section 2(1) of the Act could fall within the restrictions of Section 3(d).172 
Negating this argument, the Supreme Court referred to the parliamentary debates 
of 2005 where it was observed that Section 3(d) was amended to prevent abuse of 
product patents in medicines and agricultural products and to preclude the 
“evergreening” of pharmaceutical products.173 The court noted that Section 3(d) 
was meant especially to cover pharmaceutical products, and it created a second tier 
of qualifying standards for patenting pharmaceutical products.174 
 
ii. Novartis’ Contentions 
 
Novartis contended that the scope of coverage under a claim in a patent is 
distinct from and wider than what is disclosed under the patent in its specification, 
meaning imatinib mesylate was covered under the Zimmermann (prior art) patent 
and ergo out of bounds for production by any person other than Novartis, but since 
it was not disclosed under the Zimmermann patent, there was all likelihood for it 
to be invented and consequently for it to be patented by Novartis in India.  
Novartis further argued that a “conceivable” substance is not necessarily a 
“known” substance as required under Section 3(d) and that “known” meant well 
established and proven beyond doubt. It submitted that neither imatinib nor 
imatinib mesylate had any “known” efficacy in that sense and therefore the 
question of enhanced efficacy of the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate 
would not ensue. The Court, in rejecting the contention held that even the term 
“publicly known” although it may warrant a wider interpretation than “known” 
was, in fact, interpreted more narrowly than what was submitted by Novartis. On 
this basis, the Supreme Court held that the beta crystalline form of imatinib 
mesylate is a form of a known substance (i.e. imatinib mesylate) with known 
efficacy. 
With respect to the first contention put forth by Novartis that there is a 
distinction between claim coverage and the disclosure in the specification175, the 
Supreme Court held that such distinction, if granted, would vitiate the very 
rationale of patent law. Patent law confers a monopoly on certain persons in 
respect of their inventions for a specific period of time in exchange for the 
consideration that the invention be unveiled and made available to the public for 
the public’s benefit. The court held that including undisclosed inventions under a 
patent would emaciate the fundamental logic underlying the grant of patent rights. 
On this basis, the Supreme Court held that imatinib mesylate and its 
pharmacological properties are known from the Zimmermann patent itself and 
therefore fail to constitute an invention that can be patented under Indian law. 
                                                 




174 Id.  
175 (2013) 6 SCC 1 ¶ 136. 
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On the question of enhanced efficacy of the beta crystalline version over the 
salt version of imatinib mesylate, the Supreme Court observed that all the material 
on record compared the beta crystalline version of imatinib mesylate to the free 
base form of imatinib and there was nothing on record to compare the beta 
crystalline version with the intermediate salt version. The Supreme Court also held 
that enhanced “efficacy” of a medicine should be determined vis-a-vis its 
“therapeutic efficacy.” The Supreme Court further held that better flow, 
thermodynamic stability and lower hygroscopicity, while beneficial, do not 
determine efficacy of a medicine. On the basis of the unavailability of evidence to 
prove that the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate provided enhanced 
therapeutic efficacy over imatinib in its free base form, the court held that the beta 
crystalline version failed to pass the muster of Section 3(d) test. 
The Supreme Court came to its conclusion after a detailed analysis of the 
facts and circumstances of this case and not on the considerations of excessive 
pricing of the drugs or Novartis’ profit-making motive. The court went on to 
specify that this case should not be interpreted to mean that Section 3(d) bars all 
incremental inventions.176 With this judgment, the Court has significantly 
augmented the otherwise inchoate jurisprudence.  
The Court went ahead to note that the marketed package of Gleevec 
specified that the drug contained imatinib mesylate in its salt form and not in the 
beta crystalline form. Therefore, it observed that the patent claim appeared to be a 
camouflage to obtain a patent for imatinib mesylate, the salt form, which was not 
otherwise possible under the Indian law. 
It must be pointed out that the Supreme Court in Novartis AG v. Union of 
India did not delve into the question that whether Section 3(d) was a patent 
eligibility or patentability standard since this query did not have any bearing on its 
determination on validity in the facts of the case.177 It, however, enunciated that 
for pharmaceuticals, Section 3(d) would not operate as a patentability standard but 
as a threshold for invention, i.e. a patent eligibility criteria.178 Thus, the question as 
to what exactly is the impact of identifying Section 3(d) as a patent eligibility 
standard versus a patentability standard, remains unanswered. It can be argued that 
identifying it as a patent eligibility standard strengthens Section 3(d) itself, since it 
now becomes a threshold question prior to the tripartite patentability test.179  
It would also mean that questions of anticipation and obviousness would 
not be blurred with the Section 3(d) screening and that the latter can operate as a 
neat and distinct test. For example, since methods of surgical treatment are not 
patent eligible [under Section 3(i)], there is no need for the Patent Office to 
examine whether the method is novel or obvious or capable of use, and the 
application can be discarded at the very outset. This particular question was 
answered by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in its recent judgment of 
December 2015 in F.Hoffmann La Roche Ltd & Anr. Vs. Cipla Ltd.180 
 
                                                 
176 Id.  
177 Id. 
178 Id.  
179‘Tripartite Patentability Test’ refers to screening based on tests of ‘novelty’ & ‘obviousness’ & 
‘industrial application.’ 
180 2016 (65) PTC 1 (Del). 
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2. Roche v. Cipla  
 
Hoffman La Roche Ltd. (Roche) was the holder of US patent ‘498 
directed to the anti-cancer drug Erlotinib Hydrochloride (EH) (corresponding to 
IN ‘774).181 However, the marketable physical form of the EH molecule 
comprised both polymorph A and B of EH, and further research revealed that 
polymorph B of EH was the more thermodynamically stable; Roche thus obtained 
a separate patent in the US for the polymorph B compound (U.S.’221).182 Roche 
began selling a drug by the name Tarceva in which the active pharmaceutical 
ingredient was the B polymorphic form of EH and was hence covered by US 
‘221.183 Roche’s patent application for the B polymorphic form in India (Patent 
Application DEL ‘507), however, was rejected by the Controller on the ground 
that the increased thermodynamic stability of Polymorph B fell below the Section 
3(d) standard of enhanced therapeutic efficacy.  
Roche sued Cipla in early 2008184 over their lung cancer drug Erlocip for 
infringing Patent IN ‘774 (“suit patent”) for “A NOVEL [6, 7-BIS(2- 
METHOXYETHOXY) QUINAZOLIN-4-YL]- (3-ETHYNYLPHENYL) AMINE 
HYDROCHLORIDE” also known as Erlotinib Hydrochloride, which was licensed 
to Roche. Roche had been manufacturing this compound as an anti-cancer drug 
under the brand name Tarceva across the world and had introduced it in India in 
April 2006. The suit attracted worldwide attention because it was the first time that 
an Indian pharmaceutical manufacturer had made and sold a generic version of a 
patented drug following India’s introduction in 2005 of a TRIPS-mandated 
product patent regime for pharmaceuticals.  
After initial litigation in the Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court 
concerning the grant of interim relief, the substantive matter came up for trial 
before a Single Judge Bench of the Delhi High Court. 185 The Single Judge held 
that while Roche’s patent IN ‘774 was valid (as the counter claim for revocation 
could not be proved), Roche was unable to prove through evidence that the alleged 
infringing product did, in fact, infringe their patent. The judge therefore held in 
favor of CIPLA, and Hoffman LaRoche appealed the decision to the Division 












                                                 
181 Id.  
182 Id.  
183 Id. 
184 Id. at ¶ 5. 
185 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. vs. Cipla Ltd; (2009) 40 PTC 125 (Del).  
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a. Division Bench (DB) Judgment 
 
i. Arguments Advanced 
 
At the Division Bench Cipla argued that Roche, by seeking an 
independent patent on the B polymorphic form, had clearly sought to distinguish 
that form from the invention disclosed in IN ‘774/US ‘498. Further, it contended 
that the fact that the application for the B polymorphic form failed on Section 3(d) 
grounds meant that the provision could “not be (then) utilized as a tool to enhance 
the ambit of a patent to cover even those forms which have either been abandoned 
by the patentee itself or rejected in India.”186 Thus, Cipla argued that it was not 
possible to construe the claims in IN ‘774 to include the B polymorphic form in 
light of the rejection under Section 3(d). 
Roche contended that Section 3 (d) of the Patents Act was not applicable 
to the instant case, as the section prohibited only derivatives of “a known 
substance.” Erlotinib did not meet the criterion of being “salts, esters, polymorphs, 
particle size, or mixture of isomers, etc.” of a “known substance,” as stipulated in 
the explanation to Section 3(d), and was therefore outside the scope of the section. 
Rather, Erlotinib was a novel compound that differed from any cited as prior art.187  
 
ii. Court’s Observations 
 
In its judgment, the Division Bench included an important focus on the 
impact of the Indian Patent Office’s rejection on the basis of Section 3(d) of 
Hoffman LaRoche’s separate patent application (DEL’507) for the B polymorphic 
form of EH, and the company’s allegation of infringement.188 The Division Bench 
observed that the test for infringement necessitates first determining the meaning 
and scope of the claims in the patent at suit, and then comparing the properly 
construed claim with the allegedly infringing product.189 Since Section 3(d) deals 
with incremental variations,190 the court felt obliged to construe the purpose and 
scope of Section 3(d), and in so doing, it shed important light on the interpretation 
of the section. 
The Division Bench analyzed various provisions of Section 2 of the 
Patent Act dealing with the requirements of patentability and related those 
provisions to Section 3(d). The court observed: 
                                                 
186 Id.at ¶ 52. 
187 Issues concerning prior art and local manufacture were also raised, but they will not be discussed 
here.  
188 Id.  
189 Earlier courts had interpreted the test as simply comparing the patented product with the allegedly 
infringing one.  
190 As noted, Section 3(d) speaks of “the enhancement of … known efficacy,” and “differ[ing] 
significantly in properties with regard to efficacy.”  
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Section 3 of the Act lays down a threshold for 
patent eligibility and is not an exception to 
Section 2(1)191 (j)192 as urged by learned 
Senior counsel for Cipla. Section 2(1)(j) 
provides a theoretical definition of an 
invention while Section 3 illustratively 
outlines what are not inventions. In other 
words, for subject matter that falls outside the 
scope of Section 3, a qualitative analysis needs 
to be employed to ascertain whether it satisfies 
the conditions of Section 2(1)(j), while for 
subject matter that falls within the scope of 
Section 3, an analysis under Section 2(1)(j) 
need not be employed as it will be rejected at 
the threshold.193 
 
Thus, the steps in analyzing a new chemical 
entity in respect of which a patent application 
is made will be:  
A new chemical entity (NCE) that is 
structurally dissimilar but functionally similar 
to an existing chemical entity is thus merely a 
substance under Section 3(d). If the substance 
has an added layer of enhanced efficacy then it 
would be treated as a “new product” and 
would be eligible for assessment under Section 
2(1)(j) to ascertain whether its formation 
involved an inventive step. If the new product 
involved one or more inventive steps, then it 
would qualify as a pharmaceutical 
substance.194 
 
Therefore, the court negated the proposition that Section 3(d) is a 
patentability standard. In terms of the conceptual distinction between the two, the 
Division Bench noted that while the novel/non-obvious/industrial application 
standard for patentability addresses the worthiness of a product to be granted 
monopoly rights, Section 3(d) seeks to prevent evergreening and the exploitation 
of those monopoly rights.  
                                                 
191 The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India) § 2(1)(l)(as amended in 2005) 
(“new invention” means any invention or technology which has not been anticipated by publication in 
any document or used in the country or elsewhere in the world before the date of filing of patent 
application with complete specification, i.e., the subject matter has not fallen in public domain or that it 
does not form part of the state of the art.”) 
192Id. §2(1)(j) (“invention” means a new product or process involving an inventive step of capable of 
industrial application.”). 
193 F.Hoffmann La Roche Ltd & Anr. Vs. Cipla Ltd, (2016) 65 PTC (Del). 
194 Id. at 62. 
39Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
40 INDIAN PATENT LAW                                          [1: 40] 
 
The Division Bench also addressed the impact on the determination of 
infringement of the Section 3(d) challenge to the B polymorph. The court held that 
“merely because an inventor applies for a latter patent that is already objectively 
included in a prior patent, but which inventor subjectively feels needs a separate 
patent application, doesn‘t mean it is to be taken at face value and therefore neither 
Section 3(d) or abandonment of subsequent patent application can be used to read 
into terms of prior application, which has to be construed on its own terms.”195 
The Court went on to examine Section 3(d) and found it contained a 
deeming fiction in relation to “salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure 
form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations and 
other derivatives of known substance;”196 namely, that they are to be considered 
the same substance as the known substance. 
The Division Bench then held that the deeming fiction in Section 3(d) 
implies that when a patent application for a substance is rejected by virtue of 
Section 3(d) because it is a derivative of a known substance, that substance would 
automatically be deemed to be covered and disclosed by the prior art on the basis 
of which the application was rejected, i.e., the known substance if under patent: 
 
We understand Section 3(d) as a positive 
provision that in fact recognizes incremental 
innovation while cautioning that the 
incremental steps may sometimes be so little 
that the resultant product is no different from 
the original. The inherent assumption in this is 
that an infringement of the resultant product 
would therefore be an infringement of the 
original i.e. the known substance and by no 
stretch of imagination can Section 3(d) be 
















                                                 
195 Id. at 66. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 73. 
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The uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of Section 3(d) has been 
interred to a great extent by the Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court in the 
Novartis and Roche landmark judgments. The judgment in Novartis focused on the 
nuances of Section 3(d) and has detailed the essentials198 required for a patent 
application to pass muster under Section 3(d). Subsequently, the Delhi High 
Court’s Division Bench judgment explained the significance and connotations of 
Section 3(d) vis-à-vis the provisions of Section 2 of the Act, especially the 
tripartite patentability test. What seems clear is that Section 3(d), apart from 
influencing the prosecution of a patent application, influences the construction of 
the claims of the patent of a known substance whose “salts, esters, ethers, 
polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, 
complexes, combinations and other derivatives of known substance”199 is sought 
to be patented independently (but fails because of Section 3(d)). 
What also emerges from the case law is that the terms “disclosed” and 
“covered” by a patent refer to two separate concepts. “Covered” connotes whether 
a certain product can be said to be within the four corners of the claims of the 
patent at suit. It is relevant in an infringement analysis. The ruling of the court in 
the Roche case would mean that the salts, esters, etc. would be deemed to be 
covered by the patent, if so claimed, and thus any manufacture thereof would 
infringe the original patented product. “Disclosed” refers to whether the patent 
adequately teaches a certain aspect of an invention; whether chemical 
composition, structure, and use, etc., is relevant to a validity analysis. Thus, there 
might be cases, like Roche, where a patent covers a salt, ester, etc., for the purpose 
of infringement, but does not actually teach the distilling out or manufacture of 
that particular salt, ester, etc. 
 
B. Sections 3(k) and 3(m) 
 
Sections 3(k) and 3(m) were added to the Section 3 exclusion list with the 
2002 Amendments. The exclusions under these sections are for mathematical or 
business methods, computer programs per se, or algorithms (Section 3(k)), and for 
mere schemes or rules or methods for performing metal acts or methods for 
playing a game (Section 3(m)). They are analogous to the exceptions under Article 
52 of the European Patent Convention (EPC):  
                                                 
198 Novaris Ag. v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1 (India) (The Supreme Court essentially held that a 
substance can be stated to have enhanced “efficacy” for the purposes of § 3(d) of the Patents Act only if 
its ability to cure a disease is enhanced as compared to a ‘known’ substance in question. However, the 
Supreme Court has not made any finding on the question of the mode of proving enhance efficacy and 
has left that question open.).  
199 The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India). 
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Patentable inventions: 
1) European patents shall be granted for any 
inventions, in all fields of technology, provided 
that they are new, involve an inventive step and 
are susceptible of industrial application.  
(2) The following in particular shall not be 
regarded as inventions within the meaning of 
paragraph 1: 
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and 
mathematical methods;  
(b) aesthetic creations;  
(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing 
mental acts, playing games or doing business, 
and programs for computers;  
(d) presentations of information.  
(3) Paragraph 2 shall exclude the patentability 
of the subject-matter or activities referred to 
therein only to the extent to which a European 
patent application or European patent relates to 
such subject-matter or activities as such. 
 
Although most of these exceptions are universally accepted, Sections 3(k) 
and 3(m) have attracted significant attention in India over the past decade. Prior to 
the enactment of the 2005 amendments, the Government of India promulgated the 
Patents (Amendment) Ordinance 2004.200 The ordinance was necessitated to meet 
the January 1, 2005, deadline to bring India’s patent laws in compliance with the 
TRIPS Agreement.201 After much deliberation it was deemed necessary to, among 
other things, “modify and clarify the provisions relating to the patenting of 
software related inventions when they have technical application to industry or in 
combination with hardware.”202 The ordinance proposed splitting Section 3(k) into 
3(k) relating to computer programs per se and 3(k)(a) relating to mathematical or 
business methods and algorithms: 
 
                                                 
200 Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004, No. 7, Acts of Parliament, 2004 (India).  
201 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
202 Id. at Statement of Objects and Reasons. 
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Sections 3(d) and 3(k) of the Patents Act 1970 
in the Patents (Amendment) Ordinance 2004 
3. In section 3 of the principal Act,– 
(a) in clause (d), for the words “new use”, the 
words “mere new use” shall be substituted; 
(b) for clause (k), the following clauses shall be 
substituted, namely:– 
“(k) a computer program per se other than its 
technical application to industry or a 
combination with hardware; 
(ka) a mathematical method or a business 
method or algorithms;”. 
 
The 2004 Ordinance lapsed in due course and was replaced by the 2005 
Amendments. It is significant to note the 2005 Amendments did not adopt the 
changes to Section 3(k) as proposed in the 2004 Ordinance. The language of 
Section 3(k) reverted back to the one introduced by the 2002 Amendments, and 
that language continues to be in force. This reversal in the language has been the 
basis for much debate and confusion regarding the scope of the exclusion under 
section 3(k), particularly with respect to the interpretation of inventions related to 
computer programs per se.  
  
1. The Indian Patent Office Perspective on Section 3(k) 
 
In 2013, the Indian Patent Office released draft guidelines for the 
examination of computer related inventions (the “Draft Guidelines”). In that draft, 
the Patent Office contended that “the re-instatement of the original phraseology of 
section 3 (k) [in the 2005 Amendment] clearly indicates that the legislature 
intended to retain the original scope of exclusion and did not approve its widening 
under this sub-section as attempted through the ordinance.”203 
                                                 
203 Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, Guidelines For Examination 
Of Computer Related Inventions 6 (2013), 
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/writereaddata/Portal/IPOGuidelinesManuals/1_36_1_2-draft-Guidelines-cris-
28june2013.pdf. 
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It is debatable whether the language and clarification proposed by the 
2004 Ordinance in fact attempted to “widen” the scope of exclusion under Section 
3(k) or merely to clarify the exclusions for computer programs per se. 
Nevertheless, the Draft Guidelines went on to categorically reject “a computer 
programme which may work on any general purpose known computer” as not 
meeting the requirements of the law as to patent-eligible subject matter.204 The 
Draft Guidelines emphasized that a novel hardware feature must be present for a 
computer program to be considered patentable. In this regard, the Draft Guidelines 
cautioned examiners to focus on “the underlying substance of the invention, not 
the particular form in which it is claimed.”205 Moreover, the Draft Guidelines 
asserted that, without disclosure of structural features, “means plus function claims 
shall be rejected as these means are nothing but computer program per se.”206  
The emphasis on novel hardware as a precursor to patent eligibility was 
roundly criticized by the industry as a “no new hardware - no patent” approach, 
going against the legislative intent of restricting the “exclusion only to stand alone 
computer programs, i.e., ‘computer programs per se.’”207  
A little over two years later, the patent office issued the “final” guidelines 
for examination of computer related inventions in August 2015, the “August 
Guidelines”.208 The August Guidelines sought to determine patent eligible subject 
matter based on considering “the claims, taken as a whole” and not denying a 
patent if in substance the claims “do not fall in any of the excluded category.”209 
The August Guidelines did not attach much significance to the exclusion of the 
clarifying amendments proposed by the 2004 Ordinance. Instead, it placed more 
emphasis on the legislative history; in particular, the deliberations of the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee (JPC) entrusted to review the 2002 Amendments as well 
as the submissions of the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion on this 
matter. The JPC Report on the 2002 Amendments with respect to the term “per 
se” used in conjunction with computer programs concluded that:  
 
                                                 
204 Id. at 20. 
205 Id. at 32. 
206 Id. at 36. 
207 See National Association of Software and Services Companies, Comments On The Draft Guidelines 
On Computer Related Inventions (2013), 
http://ipindia.nic.in/iponew/CRI_Comments_Feedbacks/related_doc/NASSCOM-
feedback%20to%20CRI%20guidance.pdf. 
208Indian Patent Office, Guidelines For Examination Of Computer Related Inventions (2015), 
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/CRI_Guidelines_21August2015.pdf.  
209 Id. at 10, (“Form and Substance” discussion at § 6 of the Draft Guidelines, which emphasises the 
exclusion aspect of the determination.).  
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This change has been proposed because 
sometimes the computer program may include 
certain other things, ancillary thereto or 
developed thereon. The intention here is not to 
reject them for grant of patent if they are 
inventions. However, the computer programs 
as such are not intended to be granted patent. 
This amendment has been proposed to clarify 
the purpose.210  
 
In view the legislative intent as evident above, the August Guidelines 
directed the examiners that when claims are not directed to a computer program 
“in itself,” have industrial applicability, and fulfill other criteria for patentability, 
then “the patent should not be denied.”211  
                                                 
210 Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Patents (Second Amendment) Bill, 1999, 
presented to the Rajya Sabha on December 19, 2001, ¶ 15, Cl. 4. Online: 
http://164.100.47.5/webcom/MoreInfo/PatentReport.pdf. Last accessed March 17, 2016. 
211 Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, Guidelines For Examination 
Of Computer Related Inventions 12 (2015), Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related 
Inventions published by the Indian Patent Office on August 21, 2015. Online: 
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/CRI_Guidelines_21August2015.pdf. 
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However, any euphoria surrounding the clarity brought by the August 
Guidelines was short lived. Bowing to pressure from certain sections of 
stakeholders, the Patent Office put the August Guidelines “in abeyance”212 and 
replaced them with yet another version in February 2016, “the February 
Guidelines.”213 A detailed analysis in respect of assessing subject matter eligibility 
for inventions involving interactions between novel software and known hardware 
is conspicuous in its absence from the February Guidelines. Earlier, the August 
Guidelines had indicated that when such interactions go beyond “normal” 
interactions, and bring “a further technical effect,” the claims may not be 
considered as excluded subject matter under Section 3(k).214 The August 
Guidelines set out six criteria to ascertain whether claims have the requisite 
technical advancements to escape the exclusion under Section 3(k). 215  These 
criteria are analogous to the factors identified by the England and Wales High 
Court in AT&T Knowledge Ventures LP and CVON Innovations Limited vs. The 
Comptroller General of Patents.216 
Instead, the February Guidelines adopted a three-stage test for examining 
computer-related inventions under Section 3(k) of the Patents Act 1970: 
 
(1) Properly construe the claim and identify 
the actual contribution; 
(2) If the contribution lies only in 
mathematical method, business method or 
algorithm, deny the claim; 
                                                 
212 Office Order 70 (2015), http://ipindia.nic.in/officeCircular/officeOrder_14December2015.pdf. 
213Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, Guidelines For Examination 
Of Computer Related Inventions (2016), 
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/GuidelinesExamination_CRI_19February2016.pdf.  
214 Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, Guidelines For Examination 
Of Computer Related Inventions (2015), Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions 
published by the Indian Patent Office on August 21, 2015. Online: 
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/CRI_Guidelines_21August2015.pdf. 
215Id. at 13–14 (The criteria are: (i) whether the claimed technical feature has a technical contribution 
on a process which is carried on outside the computer; (ii) whether the claimed technical feature 
operates at the level of the architecture of the computer; (iii) whether the technical contribution is by 
way of change in the hardware or the functionality of hardware; (iv) whether the claimed technical 
contribution results in the computer being made to operate in a new way; (v) in case of a computer 
programme linked with hardware, whether the programme makes the computer a better computer in the 
sense of running more efficiently and effectively as a computer; (vi) whether the change in the 
hardware or the functionality of hardware amounts to technical advancement. If answer to ANY of the 
above questions is in affirmative, the invention may not be considered as excluded under section 3 (k) 
of the Patents Act, 1970.). 
216 AT&T Knowledge Ventures, LP, CVON Innovation Ltd. vs. and the Comptroller General of 
Patents, [Eng. & Wales 2009] EWHC 343 (Pat), ¶ 40 [hereinafter AT&T]. 
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(3) If the contribution lies in the field of 
computer programme, check whether it is 
claimed in conjunction with a novel hardware 
and proceed to other steps to determine 
patentability with respect to the invention. The 
computer programme in itself is never 
patentable. If the contribution lies solely in the 
computer programme, deny the claim. If the 
contribution lies in both the computer 
programme as well as hardware, proceed to 
other steps of patentability.217  
 
The three-stage test adopted in the February Guidelines is based on the 
approach adopted by Court of Appeals of England and Wales in Aerotel Ltd. vs. 
Telco Holdings Ltd. & Others.218 Since 2006, the Aerotel approach was reviewed 
in a number of decisions by the UK courts and found to be appropriate.219 
However, the UK courts have recognized the difficulty in assessing “whether an 
invention has made a technical contribution to the art”220 and have relied on the 
“signposts” described in AT&T.221 These “signposts” were adopted in the August 
Guidelines, but were omitted from the February Guidelines.     
Moreover, the February Guidelines fail to take into cognizance the 
nascent jurisprudence evolved in this area through the decisions of the Delhi High 
Court and the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB). We now turn our 
analysis to some of these decisions.  
 
2. Case examples 
 
Indian Patent No. 21090, entitled “Method for Controlling a Wind 
Turbine and a Wind Turbine,” was granted to Alloys Wobben. Enercon India, a 
subsidiary of Enercon GmbH, filed a petition for revocation of the patent before 
the IPAB on the grounds that the claims of the patent lacked novelty; were 
obvious; were directed to patent ineligible subject matter under section 3(k) of the 
Patents Act; and did not clearly define the scope of the invention. The IPAB held 
that the patent was invalid for lacking novelty and for being obvious in light of the 
prior art.222 However, the IPAB found that the claims directed to a method for 
controlling a wind turbine based on varying at least one operational setting within 
pre-defined limits were patent eligible and did not fall under the exclusions of 
Section 3(k).223  
Specifically, the IPAB held that a wind turbine cannot be controlled 
manually, but by using: 
                                                 
217 February Guidelines, supra note 137, § 5. 
218 Aerotel Ltd. vs. Telco Holdings Ltd. & Others Rev 1, [Eng. & Wales 2006] EWCA Civ 1371 at ¶ 
40. 
219 See, e.g., HTC Europe Co Ltd v Apple Inc (Rev 1) [2013] EWCA Civ 451 at ¶ 44.   
220 Id. at ¶ 45. 
221 AT&T, supra note 149. 
222 Intellectual Property Appellate Board Order No.224/2010, http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-224-
10-ORA-20-09-PT-CH.pdf.  
223 Id., at ¶ 86.10. 
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[A]dvanced computer technology, which 
would read the signal from the external 
conditions and carry out the corrections in its 
internal operating units[,] . . .  this technical 
process control associated with or directed to a 
computer set up to operate in accordance with 
a specified program (whether by means of 
hardware or software) for controlling or 
carrying out a technical process control such 
as the above, cannot be regarded as relating to 
a computer program per se or a set of rules of 
procedure like algorithms and thus are not 
objectionable from the point of view of 
patentability, more so when the claims do not 
claim, or contain any algorithm or its set of 
rules as such, but only comprise of some 
process steps to carry out a technical process 
or achieve a technical effect finally the 
maximum power output by controlling the 
wind turbine.224 
 
In Yahoo Inc. vs. Assistant Controller of Patents and Rediff.com,225 the 
IPAB considered, among others, the patent eligibility of Yahoo’s claims directed 
to influencing the positioning in a search result listing by a search engine. The 
Controller had rejected the claims as being directed to patent ineligible subject 
matter under Section 3(k) of the Patents Act. Rediff.com had filed a pre-grant 
opposition before the Controller and was also made a party to the appeal before 
the IPAB. 
The IPAB extensively canvassed the jurisprudence in the UK, Europe, the 
USA and Australia and concluded that limitations on patenting business methods 
were prevalent world over.226 The IPAB also delved into the policy rationale for 
including explicitly providing a listing of “what is not patentable”227 and 
concluded that “in India, the law specifically excludes business methods. There is 
clear statutory language excluding business method patents and no administrative 








                                                 
224 Id. at ¶ 79. 
225 IPAB Order No.2222011, http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-222-11-OA-22-10-PT-CH.pdf. 
226 Id. at ¶ 32 et seq. 
227 Id. citing Ayyangar at ¶ 32. 
228 Id. at ¶ 38. 
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Turning to the subject of Yahoo’s application, the IPAB held that: 
 
[T]he service product seeks to place the facts 
(bid amount) or advertisement (information) in 
hierarchy based on the payments made. This is 
nothing but doing the advertisement business 
electronically. Even the technical advance that 
is claimed over the existing art is only an 
improvement in the method of doing business 
and S.3(k) is clear that business method cannot 
be patented, the fact that there is an advance 
has not improved the case. Therefore, we 
affirm that this ground alone is sufficient to 
reject the present application.229  
 
The IPAB, interestingly, opined that determination of patent eligibility 
under Section 3 of the Patents Act was a threshold question, prior to proceeding to 
the analysis for novelty, non-obviousness, and other issues.  
 
The Act defines “what is an invention” and 
then marks out which inventions are not 
patentable. So the first test is the patentability 
test. If what is submitted falls within the S.3 
subjects, then we need not explore further. If it 
does not, then we examine whether it is an 
invention as defined in S(2). If it satisfies the 
definition, it will have to cross the tests of 
novelty, non-obviousness, anticipation, 
disclosure, etc.230 
 
This approach was later confirmed by the Division Bench of the Delhi 
High Court in Roche v. Cipla, discussed earlier. Accenture Global 
Service GmbH’s Indian Patent Application No. 01398/DELNP/2003, 
entitled “Distributed Development Environment for Building Internet 
Applications by Developers at Remote Locations,” was rejected by the 
Controller as being directed to computer program per se and hence 
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under section 3(k) of the 
Patents Act. The Controller’s order followed a two-part framework for 
examination of the claimed subject matter:  
 
1. A hardware implementation performing a 
novel function is not patentable if that 
particular hardware is known or is obvious 
irrespective of the function performed.  
                                                 
229 Id. at ¶ 48. 
230 Id. at ¶ 19. 
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2. If the novel features of the invention resides 
in a set of instructions [program] designed to 
cause the hardware to perform the desired 
operations without special adoption of the 
hardware or modification of the hardware, 
then the matter claimed either alone or in 
combination is not patentable [emphasis 
added].231 
 
Accenture contended that the Controller’s framework for determining 
patent eligibility was unsubstantiated in law. The IPAB agreed that the Controller 
relied on standards “neither mentioned in the Indian Patent Act nor in the Patent 
Office Manual or in guidelines by the Indian Courts in such matters.”232 The IPAB 
held that the Controller’s order was “based on ill-founded premises far from being 
logical and reasonable.”233 Upon remand from the IPAB, the Controller granted 
the patent stating that the patent claimed a system “which is having [sic] the 
improvement in web services and software” and hence is not software, per se.234 
In March 2015, the Delhi High Court had the opportunity to clarify the 
scope of the exclusions under Sections 3(k) and 3(m) of the Patents Act.235 
Opposing Ericsson’s (Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson) motion for a permanent 
injunction, Intex contended, among others, that Ericsson’s patents in suit were 
invalid as they were directed to patent ineligible subject matter.236 The patents in 
suit were eight patents granted to Ericsson in India and related to three technology 
areas in telecommunications, namely, Adaptive Multi-Rate Speech Codec; 
Features in 3G phones; and Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE). 
Specifically, Intex contended that Ericsson’s patents were directed to 
mathematical methods, algorithms, computer program per se (all patent ineligible 
subject matter under Section 3(k) of the Patents Act), or were directed to a mere 
scheme or rule or a method for performing a metal act (patent ineligible subject 
matter under Section 3(m) of the Patents Act) and hence invalid.237 
                                                 
231 IPAB Order No.283/2012 at para. 9, http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-283-2012-OA-22-2009-
PT-DEL%20(Final).pdf. 
232 Id. at ¶ 11. 
233 Id. 
234 Controller’s Order in 1398/DELNP/2003 dated May 10, 2013, 
http://ipindiaservices.gov.in/decision/1398-DELNP-2003-2646/1398DELNP2003.pdf. 
235 Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson vs. Intex Technologies (India) Ltd., High Court of Delhi, I.A. No. 
6735/2014 in CS(OS) No.1045/ 2014 [(hereinafter Ericsson). 
236 Id. The eight patents are IN 203034, 203036, 203086, 213723, 229632, 234157, 240471, and 
241747.  
237 Id. at ¶¶ 107–08. 
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The Delhi High Court, similar to the IPAB in Yahoo, considered238 at 
length the legislative history of Sections 3(k) and 3(m); the provisions of Article 
27 of the TRIPS agreement; the position of the European Union, the UK, and the 
USA, including the US Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. vs. CLS Bank 
International,239 and concluded that “prima facie […] any invention which has a 
technical contribution or has a technical effect and is not merely a computer 
program per se […] is patentable.”240 However, the Court acknowledged that 
Intex’s revocation petitions were pending and that the issues of patent eligibility 
under Sections 3(k) and 3(m) have to be considered on their merit in the 
revocation proceedings. Nevertheless, the Court held that it was “not impressed 
with the argument of the defendant that the injunction be refused on this 




It is evident that the nascent jurisprudence evolving in India with respect 
to subject matter eligibility under Sections 3(k) and 3(m) of the Patents Act 1970 
is harmonious with that in the UK and Europe and to some extent the USA as well. 
There are certain clear exceptions under Sections 3(k) and 3(m) the Indian Patents 
Act 1970 – mathematical methods; business methods; algorithms; mere schemes or 
rules or methods for performing metal acts; and methods for playing a game are 
patent ineligible. Similarly, claims directed to computer-readable medium are also 
not patent eligible as they are considered to be computer program per se. 
However, computer-related inventions where the actual (or technical) contribution 
lies in novel hardware or a combination of (known) hardware and software are 
patent eligible. The August Guidelines, by adopting the AT&T signposts for the 
determination of technical contribution were in line with the decisions of the IPAB 
and that of the Delhi High Court, especially in following the UK jurisprudence. 
However, the February Guidelines, although incorporating the basic Aerotel test, 
fell short by not following the decisions of the IPAB and the directions provided 
by the Delhi High Court. The February Guidelines’ stated objectives of fostering 
“uniformity and consistency” in the examination of computer-related inventions 
and of bringing “clarity in terms of exclusions expected under section 3(k)” for 
speedy examination of eligible applications242 would have immensely benefitted 
had the February Guidelines included the AT&T signposts as determinants of 
technical advancement. Currently, the February Guidelines are being actively 
reviewed, and there is yet hope that these deficiencies may be addressed in the 
near future.     
                                                 
238 Ibid., at ¶¶ 110–120. 
239 134 U.S. 2347 (2014). 
240 Ericsson, supra note 154 at ¶ 120. 
241 Ibid. 
242 February Guidelines, supra note 137 at section 1.3. 
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V. DISCLOSURES RELATED TO FOREIGN APPLICATIONS 
 
Justice Ayyangar believed that “[the] national economy would be better 
served if the continental or the American system, whereunder publication of the 
invention before the priority date in any part of the world constitutes anticipation, 
were adopted.”243 Accordingly, the Ayyangar Report recommended to dispense 
with the “geographical limitation as to anticipation under the Indian law”.244 The 
Report also recommended to do away with the “‘fifty years’ rule as to anticipatory 
documents” proposed in the Patents Bill 1953.245 However, there was a practical 
problem in adopting these recommendations: “the Examiner in the Patent Office 
might naturally not have adequate facilities for determining novelty on the basis of 
publications abroad . .  .”246 In order to overcome this difficulty, Justice Ayyangar 
opined that “it would be useful to require the applicant to furnish […] whether [the 
applicant] has made any application for a patent for the same or substantially the 
same invention as in India in any foreign country or countries, the objections, if 
any, raised by the Patent Offices of such countries on the ground of want of 
novelty or unpatentability or otherwise and the amendments directed to be made or 
actually made to the specification or claims in the foreign country or countries up 
to the date of acceptance of the application.”247 As if a pre-cursor to present day 
Patent Prosecution Highway mechanisms, Justice Ayyangar believed that “this 
information would be of great use for a proper examination of the application.”248 
Additionally, Justice Ayyangar suggested that applicants undertake to keep the 
Controller apprised on any further foreign applications made and of the orders 
made on such applications after the date of the Indian application.249 These 
proposals were justified based on Rule 39 of the Canadian Patent Rules and a 
resolution passed at the Commonwealth Conference on Patents and Trade Marks 
at Canberra.250 Thus, the genesis for Section 8 of the Patents Act, 1970 can be 
traced back to the Ayyangar Report of 1959. 
Section 8 of the Patents Act, 1970251 requires patent applicants to disclose 
to the Indian Patent Office information regarding foreign patent applications. It is 
pertinent to note that failure to adhere to this provision at the stage of prosecution 
before the Patent Office may result in revocation of a patent after it has been 
granted 252 or may serve as a ground of opposition, both at the pre- and post-grant 
stages.253 Over the last decade, this provision has become one of the main grounds 
for either seeking revocation of patents or for seeking denial of equitable relief 
during infringement proceedings. 
                                                 
243 Ayyangar, supra note 7 at ¶ 378. 
244 Ibid., at section heading between paragraphs 110 and 111. Prior to changes to Section 13(2) in the 
Patents Act, 1970, based on Clause 12 of the Ayyanger Report, anticipatory publications were limited 
to India. 
245 Ibid., at section heading between paragraphs 113 and 114. 
246 Ibid., at ¶ 113. 
247 Ibid. at ¶ 350. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Ibid. at ¶ 351. 
250 Ibid. at ¶ 352. 
251 Patents Act, 1970, supra note 19 at section 8. 
Information and undertaking regarding foreign applications.  
(1) Where an Applicant for a Patent under this Act is prosecuting either alone or jointly with any other 
person an application for a Patent in any country outside India in respect of the same or substantially 
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A. Interpretation of Section 8(1) 
 
Under Section 8(1), the applicant is required to file a completed statement and 
undertaking (Form 3) in respect of patent(s)/patent application(s) for the same or 
substantially the same invention, filed outside India as on the date of filing of the 
application in India.254 This undertaking has to be filed within 6 months from the 
date of filing of the Indian Patent Application.255 As per the ordinary meaning of 
the words used in Section 8(1)(b), if there are any subsequent patent filings (such 
as a new application, divisional application, continuation application etc.) in other 
jurisdictions for the same or substantially the same invention, the applicant has to 
file an updated Form 3 within 6 months (a new application, divisional application 
etc.) from the date of filing such new foreign applications.256 The submission of 
Form 3 is a statutory obligation on the part of the applicant, even if the Controller 
does not request such information. The present format for Form-3 includes a 
column for “status” and the status updates include abandonment, publication, 
opposition, allowance, grant, or rejection / revocation. 
                                                                                                                
the same invention, or where to his knowledge such an application is being prosecuted by some person 
through whom he claims or by some person deriving title from him, he shall file along with his 
application or subsequently within the prescribed period as the controller may allow-  
(a) a statement setting out detailed particulars of such application; and  
(b) an undertaking that, up to the date of grant of Patent in India, he would keep the Controller 
informed in writing, from time to time, of detailed particulars required under clause (a) in respect 
of every other application relating to the same or substantially the same invention, if any, filed in 
any country outside India subsequently to the filing of the statement referred to in the aforesaid 
clause, within the prescribed time.  
(2) At any time after an application for Patent is filed in India and till the grant of a Patent or refusal to 
grant of a Patent made thereon, the Controller may also require the Applicant to furnish details, as may 
be prescribed, relating to the processing of the application in a country outside India, and in that event 
the Applicant shall furnish to the controller information available to him within such period as may be 
prescribed.” 
252 Section 64, Patents Act, 1970 
Revocation of Patents 
(m) that the Applicant for the Patent has failed to disclose to the Controller the information required by 
section 8 or has furnished information which in any material particular was false to his knowledge. 
253 Section 25, Patents Act, 1970 
Opposition to the Patent 
(1) Where an application for a patent has been published but a patent has not been granted, any person 
may, in writing, represent by way of opposition to the Controller against the grant of patent on the 
ground— 
(h) that the applicant has failed to disclose to the Controller the information required by section 8 or has 
furnished the information which in any material particular was false to his knowledge; 
(2) At any time after the grant of patent but before the expiry of a period of one year from the date of 
publication of grant of a patent, any person interested may give notice of opposition to the Controller in 
the prescribed manner on any of the following grounds, namely:— 
(h) that the patentee has failed to disclose to the Controller the information required by 
section 8 or has furnished the information which in any material particular was false to his 
knowledge; 
254 Rule 12 of the Patent Rules, 2003 
12. Statement and undertaking regarding foreign applications.—(1) The statement and 
undertaking required to be filed by an applicant for a patent under sub-section (1) of section 
8 shall be made in Form 3. 
(1A).The period within which the applicant shall file the statement and undertaking under 
sub-section (1) of section 8 shall be six months from the date of filing the application.  
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B. Interpretation of Section 8(2) 
 
Under Section 8(2), the applicant may be required by the Controller to submit 
certain prescribed details, as regards corresponding foreign applications.257 Under 
Rule 12(3) of the Patents Rules, 2003, the Controller may request information 
relating to the objections raised by other patent offices and any other particulars, 
including the claims allowed.258 The Controller usually requires details such as 
search and/or exanimation reports issued by all the major Patent Offices, such as 
USPTO, EPO and JPO etc., and amendments made to the corresponding 
applications. As per Rule 12(3), the patent applicant needs to provide the 
necessary information requested by the Controller, within 6 months from the date 
of request.259 
 
C. Jurisprudence Surrounding Section 8 Related Issues 
 
Until recently, there existed unwarranted discrepancy owing to 
contradictory interpretations of Section 8 by the Delhi High Court and the 
Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB). The contradiction was specifically 
on the issue of whether compliance under Section 8 is strict to the extent that mere 
non-compliance, despite non-establishment of advertence or intention in such non-
compliance, will be sufficient to prevent grant of the patent or to revoke the patent, 
as the case may be.260 
                                                                                                                
 Explanation.—For the purpose of this rule, the period of six months in case of an 
application corresponding to an international application in which India is designated shall 
be reckoned from the actual date on which the corresponding application is filed in India.  
(2) The time within which the applicant for a patent shall keep the Controller informed of 
the details in respect of other applications filed in any country in the undertaking to be given 
by him under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 8 shall be six months from the date of 
such filing. 
(3) When so required by the Controller under sub-section (2) of section 8, the applicant shall 
furnish information relating to objections, if any, in respect of novelty and patentability of 
the invention and any other particulars as the Controller may require which may include 
claims of application allowed within six months from the date of such communication by 
the Controller. 
255 Supra note 111. 
256 Supra note 111. 
257 Supra note 111. 
258 Supra note 111. 
259 Supra note 111. 
260 2012 (52) 1 PTC (Del), IPAB Order No. 166 of 2012. 
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On the one hand, the Delhi High Court in F.Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. 
Cipla Ltd.261 held that under Section 64 of the Patents Act, there exists discretion 
to revoke or not to revoke the patent for non-compliance of Section 8 of the 
Patents Act based on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court held that 
the discretion exists owing to the wording of Section 64 of the Act, which deals 
with the revocation of patents.262 Thus, exercising its discretion, the Court held 
that Roche's patent could not be revoked solely on the ground of non-compliance 
of Section 8 of the Patents Act.  
Thereafter, the Delhi High Court in Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V v. 
Maj. (Retd) Sukesh Behl & Anr263 specifically observed that that to fall foul of 
Section 8 of the Act, one must show that there was deliberate or willful 
suppression of information and that the information which was not submitted was 
material to the grant of the patent in India. Philips filed for permanent injunction 
against Sukesh Behl and others for infringing its DVD Video/DVD ROM Disc 
patents, especially patent No. 218255. Sukesh Behl filed a counter-claim for 
revocation of the patent under Section 64(1)(m)264 of the Patents Act for non-
compliance with the provisions of Section 8 of the Act, read with Rule 12 of the 
Patent Rules, 2003265. Philips later filed a letter containing the updated list of 
pending foreign applications before the Controller. Furthermore, Philips' patent 
attorney also filed an affidavit along with the above letter stating that the omission 
was inadvertent as the details on one page of the document sent by Philips were 
accidentally missed and was with no intention to suppress any information from 
the Indian Patent Office.  
Subsequently, Sukesh Behl filed an application under Order XII Rule 6 of 
the Civil Procedure Code, 1908266 to pass a decree on the basis of the alleged 
admission made by Philips with respect to lack of disclosure of information under 
Section 8 of the Patents Act. The Court observed that although Philips did not 
deny that a part of the information regarding pending foreign applications was not 
disclosed, there was also no admission that such withholding of information was a 
result of deliberate or willful suppression267. The Court further held that the 
question as to whether the undisclosed information was material to the grant of the 
patent would have to be put to trial and could not be conclusively determined at a 
preliminary stage268.  
                                                 
261 2012 (52) 1 PTC (Del). 
262 2012 (52) 1 PTC (Del) at ¶ 156. Section 64 of the Patents Act provides in part as follows: “Subject 
to the provisions contained in this Act, a patent, whether granted before or after the commencement of 
this Act, may, be revoked on a petition of any person interested or of the Central Government by the 
Appellate Board or on a counter-claim in a suit for infringement of the patent by the High Court on any 
of the following grounds....” 
263 2013 (56) PTC 570 (Del). 
264 Supra note 109. 
265 Supra note 111. 
266 Order XII Rule 6 Judgment on admissions.- (1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in 
the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the court may at any stage of the suit, either on 
the application of an party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other 
question between the parties, make such Order or give such judgment as It may think fit, having regard 
to such admissions. 
(2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up in accordance 
with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced. 
267 2013 (56) PTC 570 (Del) paragraph 13. 
268 Id. 
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On the other hand, the IPAB followed a more rigid approach towards 
Section 8 compliance and did not adopt the interpretation provided by the above 
rulings of the Delhi High Court. In Tata Chemicals Limited v. Hindustan Unilever 
Limited & Anr.,269 the IPAB was called on to rule on whether failure to submit an 
adverse International Preliminary Examination Report (IPER) in response to a 
request by the Controller under Section 8(2) was sufficient to revoke the patent. 
The IPAB first noted that the information relating to the applications under the 
Patent Co-operation Treaty (PCT), such as the International Search Report (ISR) 
and the IPER, would be covered within the scope of a Section 8(2) request.270 The 
IPAB held that this failure was per se sufficient to revoke the patent.271 The 
patentee attempted to argue that the prior art cited in the IPER was anyway cited 
by the Patent Office during its own examination and accordingly, no serious 
prejudice was caused.272 However, the IPAB rejected this argument and adopted 
the following reasoning:  
 
The respondent cannot be heard to say that 
since European Patent No.1106578, the prior 
art was anyway considered by the Controller 
and no prejudice was caused by not disclosing 
the ISR or IPER. It is not enough that the 
Examiner knew that this prior art was there, 
the respondent ought to have disclosed the 
results of the IPER. The IPER rejected the 
claims 1 to 3 on both the grounds of novelty 
and inventive step. It is not for us to conjecture 
what effect this might have had on the 
examiner here if he had the benefit of the 
IPER. This is the object and purpose of 
enacting Section 8. The Report says that this 
information would be of great use for a proper 
examination of the application. It is no answer 
to say anyway the office looked at EP’578. 
The Patent Office did not see the IPER. The 
learned counsel for the respondent submitted 
that this lapse is of a de-minimis nature, we do 
not think that honestly furnishing the 
information or particulars allows a de-minimis 
qualification . . . . The knowledge of the prior 
art is not the same as the opinion of the 
EPO[which issued the IPER. 273 
 
                                                 
269 IPAB Order No. 166 of 2012. 
270 Id. at ¶ 105. 
271 Id. at ¶¶ 107, 111. 
272 Id. at ¶ 106. 
273 Id.  
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The finding in the Tata Chemicals decision was based on the language 
used in the statute as well as the object and purpose of Section 8 as was stated in 
the Ayyangar Report.274 The IPAB observed that the purpose for introducing this 
provision was to ensure that it would be an advantage for the Indian Patent Office 
to know the objections raised by the patent offices outside India regarding the 
patentability, anticipation and/or claim amendments if any made or to be made. 275 
The IPAB reiterated its strict interpretation of Section 8 in Fresenius 
Kabi Oncology Limited v. Glaxo Group Limited and The Controller of Patents276 
as well as in Ajantha Pharma Ltd. v. Allergan Inc.277 The IPAB in Fresenius also 
held that divisional applications would also fall within the scope of “same and 
substantially the same” invention under Section 8 and thus information relating to 
divisional applications needed to be provided.278  
While emphasizing strict compliance under Section 8 of the Patents Act, 
the IPAB has also simultaneously held that Section 8 must be carefully applied 
and that it was never intended to be a bonanza for all those who want an 
inconvenient patent removed.279 The IPAB observed that an applicant seeking 
revocation for non-compliance of a patent under Section 8 may not merely state 
that the requirements have not been fulfilled.280 It was observed that the initial 
burden is on the person seeking to challenge the patent or patent application for 
non-compliance under Section 8 to show how exactly Section 8 was not complied 
with.281 The IPAB also held that such person must also plead as to how the 
invention disclosed in a particular foreign application is the “same or substantially 
the same invention.”282 
The IPAB has also reprimanded the Patent Office for issuing vague 
requests seeking compliance under Section 8 as part of the examination reports in 
the course of prosecution of the patent application. In Glaxo Group Limited v. The 
Controller of Patents,283 the IPAB held that the Patent Office must seek relevant 
information. The IPAB essentially emphasized that information routinely sought 
by the Patent Office, such as seeking office actions/amendments from “any one of 
the major patent offices etc.,” is misleading as the patent applicant may be able to 
satisfy the burden under Section 8(2) by just giving relevant information from any 
one of the patent offices across the world and thereby avoid giving pertinent 
information in respect of applications in other patent offices and thereby defeating 
the objective behind the provision.284   
                                                 
274 Id. at ¶ 91. 
275 IPAB Order No. 161 of 2013 at ¶ 66. 
276 IPAB Order No. 161 of 2013. 
277 IPAB Order No. 173/2013 at ¶ 69. 
278 IPAB Order No. 161 of 2013 at ¶ 73. 
279 IPAB Order No. 161 of 2013 at ¶ 60. 
280 Id. at ¶71. 
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282 IPAB Order No. 161 of 2013 at ¶ 71. 
283 Order No. 161/2013 at ¶ 75. 
284 IPAB Order No. 166 of 2013 at ¶ 75. 
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While the interpretation by the Delhi High Court regarding the standard 
of willful or deliberate suppression as opposed to strict compliance was raised 
before the IPAB, the IPAB in a consistent line of cases,285 held that the Act does 
not make any qualification to the obligation to submit information or the 
requirement to revoke the patent for failure to submit that information. Thus, the 
trend as derived from the judicial pronouncements by the IPAB pointed to strict 
compliance under Section 8, albeit the person seeking revocation needs to satisfy 
its basic minimum burden of proof.286  
One must be mindful of the fact that orders of the High Court are binding 
on the IPAB owing to hierarchy of judicial precedents. Thus, the orders of the 
Delhi High Court with respect to the interpretation of Section 8 as early as 2012 
ought to have been followed by the IPAB thereafter. However, probably owing to 
the lapse on the part of the arguing counsels in the IPAB cases, in citing the High 
Courts’ interpretation, the IPAB continued to follow a strict approach.  
The position was restored with the Division Bench (two judge bench) 
order of the Delhi High Court in the case of Maj. (Retd.) Sukesh Behl & Another v. 
Koninklijke Philips Electronics287, the appellate forum that adjudicated and upheld 
the earlier order of the Delhi High Court in the Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V 
v. Maj. (Retd) Sukesh Behl & Anr288. In upholding the interpretation of Section 8 
as stated in the previous orders of the Delhi High Court, the interpretation of 
Section 8 is now settled.  
The Division Bench held that the word “may” used in Section 64(1) itself 
indicates the intention of the legislature that the power conferred thereunder is 
discretionary.289 Further, the Bench held that the mere fact that the requirement of 
furnishing information about the corresponding foreign applications under Section 
8(1) is mandatory, it is not the determinative factor of the legislative intent of 
Section 64(1).290 Therefore, the Bench held that though any violation of the 
requirement under Section 8 may attract Section 64(1)(m)291 for revocation of the 
patent, such revocation is not automatic. Thus the power to revoke a patent under 
Section 64(1) is discretionary, and consequently it is necessary for the Court to 
consider the question as to whether the omission on the part of the plaintiff was 
intentional or whether it was a mere clerical and bona fide error.292 
In Ericsson v. Intex,293 the Delhi High Court once again reiterated that to 
run afoul of Section 8, there must be lack of intent to comply with the disclosure 
requirement. Furthermore, the Court held that (emphasis added): 
 
                                                 
285 Ajantha Pharma Ltd. v. Allergan Inc IPAB Order No. 173/2013; Glaxo Group Limited v. The 
Controller of Patents IPAB Order No. 161 of 2013. 
286 IPAB Order No. 166 of 2013 at ¶ 71. 
287 FAO (OS) No. 16 of 2014; Order dated Nov 7, 2014. 
288 2013 (56) PTC 570 (Del). 
289 FAO (OS) No. 16 of 2014 at ¶ 37. 
290 FAO (OS) No. 16 at ¶ 37. 
291 Section 64(1)(m) provides that a patent may be revoked on the grounds “that the applicant has failed 
to disclose to the Controller the information required by section 8 or has furnished information which 
in any material particular was false to his knowledge.” 
292 FAO (OS) No. 16 at ¶ 40. 
293 Ericsson, supra note 159 at ¶ 104. 
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So long as Indian Patent Office [is] informed 
of all the major jurisdictions in which patents 
have been granted and substantial details are 
placed on record, the obligation of complying 
with Section 8 stands satisfied unless the 
Controller of Patents seeks some more 
detail(s) in order to satisfy his own conscious 
in order to understand the compliance of said 
provision. The said Section should not be 
interpreted in the manner that every shred of 
paper filed in every foreign country has to be 




The law with respect to the determination as to whether a patent can be 
revoked based on non-compliance of Section 8 of the Patent Act is now settled and 
is in tune with such requirements in other jurisdictions, such as the USA, and is 
also in line with the objective behind Section 8 as set out in the Ayyangar Report. 
This position of law is also reassuring for patent applicants and patentees alike that 
their substantive right of the patent is no longer at stake merely on account of 
clerical or bona fide errors in complying with the requirements under Section 8 of 
the Patents Act. 
  
VI. FINAL NOTES 
 
Almost sixty years on, Justice Ayyangar’s recommendations continue to 
impact Indian Patent laws. Several key provisions of the Ayyangar report have 
become mainstays of the Patents Act 1970, and have survived the trilogy of 
amendments at the turn of the millennium. The provisions relating to Compulsory 
Licenses and Working of Patents; Exclusions from Patentability; and Disclosures 
related to Foreign Applications have been subject of much debate. However, the 
jurisprudence in these seemingly controversial aspects of the Indian patent law 
have slowly but significantly evolved over the last decade. 
In Nexavar, the IPAB and the Bombay High Court clarified the scope of 
the grounds on which a compulsory license may be granted.295 The Supreme 
Court, by refusing to review the orders of the Bombay High Court, upheld the 
High Court’s decision. Therefore, the jurisprudence on the compulsory licensing 
regime is largely settled in India. Nexavar in particular has established some 
ground rules for the operation of the compulsory license regime.296 Those ground 
rules as derived by the judiciary from the statutory provisions ensure that the 
compulsory licensing provisions are no longer a threat to innovation but only seek 
to balance patent rights and public interest considerations in specific factual 
circumstances.297  
                                                 
294 Id. at ¶ 103. 
295 Bayer Corporation vs. Union of India 2014 (60) PTC 277 (Bom). 
296 2014 (60) PTC 277 (Bom). 
297 Id. at ¶ 19. 
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The requirement of filing particulars related to Working of Patents 
remains a persistent issue. However, by accepting a public interest litigation, the 
Delhi High Court now has the opportunity to dispel the uncertainty surrounding 
the nature and the extent of the information required under the mandatory Form 27 
filings.    
The Supreme Court of India has categorically upheld the exclusions 
under the provisions of Section 3(d). In Gleevec and Terceva, the Supreme Court 
and the Delhi High Court, respectively, have provided much needed clarity on the 
scope of the exclusions.298 The Delhi High Court confirmed that Section 3 serves 
as a threshold test which must be assessed prior to determining patentability under 
the definition of an invention under Section 2(1)(j) of the Patents Act. 299 
The IPAB and the Delhi High Court have consistently sought to 
harmonize the exclusions under Sections 3(k) and 3(m) of the Patents Act for 
computer-implemented inventions with the international jurisprudence, 
particularly with that of the UK. It is expected that the Indian Patent Office will 
revise the recently released guidelines for the examination of computer-related 
inventions having regard to the nascent jurisprudence on this issue. 
The Delhi High Court’s decisions with respect to the scope and effect of 
the disclosure requirements under Section 8 of the Patents Act have come as a 
relief to patentees. The law in India is now along the lines of the disclosure 
provisions in the USA. The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, for its 
part, has committed to examining the feasibility of joining the WIPO Digital 
Access Service (DAS), and the Indian Patent Office has begun to participate in the 
WIPO Centralized Access for Search and Examination (CASE) system with the 
goal of improving processing efficiency. 
While patent jurisprudence in India continues to evolve, it is heartening to 
note that the Indian courts have attempted to maintain a fine balance between 
public interest and private rights. At the same time, the courts have ensured that 
India remains compliant with her international obligations, without departing from 
the spirit with which Justice Ayyangar set out to reform India’s patent laws all 
those years ago. 
 
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are the authors’ personal 
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